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I. SECTION 2.01' 
§ 2.01 Default Rule of an At-Will Employment Relationship 
Unless an agreement, statute or other law or public policy limits 
the right to terminate, either party may terminate an 
employment relationship with or without cause. 
The validity or invalidity of the core provision raises a substantial 
question of whether there should be a Restatement of Employment Law at 
all at this time. Certainly, the action of a reputable organization such as the 
ALI issuing a document that this particular statement of the at-will rule is 
the law, if in fact it is not accurate, would be damaging to the long-term 
common law process of refining rules by evolution. This is especially true 
in this circumstance, where only after a long period of judicial inaction 
while the rule had fallen into virtual desuetude,3 from the late nineteenth 
century to the late twentieth century, forty-nine state supreme courts have 
begun again to work out new rules in the evolutionary process which is the 
common law. Thus, the ALI's assertion that the at-will rule "is" the law 
today, if, in fact, the law is in considerable flux, would be inaccurate. State 
judicial acceptance of the assertion would be counterproductive to the 
common law process. There are circumstances where the best tradition of 
the Restatement, out of respect for the developing common law, would be 
to forebear from attempting to restate a law that is still changing. From a 
close reading of the cases of many jurisdictions, this is one of those 
circumstances. With only Montana thus far taking a purely statutory reform 
1. The critique of section 2.01 was written by Lea VanderVelde. 
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (Council Draft No. 3, 2008). 
3. There are several reasons that the common law failed to refine the at-will status in the early 
twentieth century but one notable reason derives from logic. Most employees could not afford to hire 
lawyers at the lawyers' customary higher pay rate to pursue job loss when the financial expectancy of 
recovery was less than the lawyers' fee. 
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path, 4 the evolutionary process necessarily involves the forty-nine other 
state supreme courts as "little laboratories of state common law 
experimentation." 5 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that different states have developed 
differently, in part based on the order of cases that came before them,6 but 
harmonization between states' employment status rules has not yet been 
given the time to work itself through. There is a very serious question 
whether harmonization should be forced in an ALI project that is 
denominated a proposed Restatement of existing law. As has been 
suggested by some of the ALI membership, it may be a wiser approach to 
proceed with a project of "Principles" rather than a "Restatement." 7 
A. Is the Employment Law ofAmerican Jurisdictions Stable? 
The Proposed Restatement's reporter justifies this ALI intervention by 
suggesting that the principles of employment law are stable. The written 
commentary to the project offers no empirical evidence for that position 
and no rationale for an intervention at this time. There are several different 
reasons to believe that state law of employment continues to be in 
considerable flux. 
First, the dissent and concurrence rate is very high in this particular 
4. While Montana is the only state to have passed legislation modifying the archaic at will 
doctrine, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-501 (2007), it is not the only U.S. jurisdiction to have done so, as 
both Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29 §l85b (2008), and the U.S. Virgin Islands, V.I. CODE ANN. 
tit. 24, § 76 (2008), have legislation modifying the harshness of the doctrine. In 1996, Arizona enacted 
the euphemistically named Arizona Employment Protection Act, which consolidated the legal theories 
that could be pursued in termination cases. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 23-1501 (LexisNexis 2008). Georgia, 
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 (2008), and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-4 (2005), have 
enacted legislation that restates the at-will doctrine in statutes. South Dakota's statute provides: "An 
employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the 
other unless otherwise provided by statute." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-4. Louisiana and North Dakota 
have similar statutes. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (2008). 
5. The famous phrase, "laboratories of democracy," derives from Brandeis's commentary on the 
virtues of federalism: "[Tihe happy incident [] of the federal system that a single courageous state may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
6. One could call this path dependency. See, e. g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path 
Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903 (2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in 
the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 
604 (2001). 
7. Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Employment Law, PROC. 85TH ANN. MTG., AM L. 
INST. 278 (2008) (comments of Mr. Greenwald). 
8. See e.g. id at 230 (remarks of Reporter Sam Estreicher to the effect that "where the law is 
settled we report it as such, but where the jurisdictions are divided we try to give guidance ... in terms 
of the better rule," implying that the law is settled, or at least that rules within individual jurisdictions 
are settled.). A closer look at the workings of the common law suggests that the rules are far from 
settled in many of the states 
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area, higher than in most state common law areas. Among the forty-nine 
citations utilized by the Reporters in an appendix to the Council suggesting 
that "at will" is the rule in the respective states, only half were unanimous 
decisions. 9 Yet, according to a survey of state supreme Court Clerks of 
Court, most supreme court decisions tend toward unanimity.' 0 In addition 
to the relatively higher dissent rate in common law employment cases, 
several courts failed to reach unanimous decisions because of 
concurrences. Even though a concurring opinion indicates a justice 
deciding with the court in result, the fact that the concurring justices' 
reasons differ from those expressed by the majority implies that there is a 
lack of agreement upon theory and accordingly, upon some range of the 
case decision's application." This fact further evidences that the governing 
common law principles, particularly the core principles, are very much in 
flux. 
Second, even within individual jurisdictions, the law appears to be in 
flux; cases adopted by majorities in one year are side stepped, repudiated or 
9. A very high proportion of the cases cited in the Restatement list had dissents as well as 
concurrences, and there were several with multiple dissenting justices. Webb Wheel Prods., Inc. v. 
Hanvey, 922 So.2d 865, 870 (Ala. 2005) (Lyons, Harwood, Woodall, Parker, JJ., dissenting); Demasse 
v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1153 (Ariz. 1999) (Jones, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Id. at 
1160 (Martone, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Ross v. Raging Wire Telecommunications, 
Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 209 (Cal. 2008) (Kennard, Moreno, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part); 
Widder v. Durango Sch. Dist. No. 9-R, 85 P.3d 518, 530 (Colo. 2004) (Rice, Hobbs, Bender, JJ, 
dissenting); Mason v. Load King Mfg. Co., 758 So.2d 649, 657 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, Anstead, Pariente, 
JJ., dissenting); Balmer v. Elan Corp., 599 S.E.2d 158, 162 (Ga. 2004) (Sears, P.J., Benham, J., 
dissenting); McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1347, 1353 (Ill. 1997) (Nickels, Miller, 
McMorrow, JJ., dissenting); Taliento v. Portland West, 705 A.2d 696, 700 (Me. 1997) (Lipez, Roberts, 
Dana, JJ., dissenting); Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 823 A.2d 590, 609 (Md. 2003) (Bell, C.J., 
Eldridge, Baker, JJ., dissenting); White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 808 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Mass. 
2004) (Cowin, J., dissenting); Lytle v. Malady, 579 N.W.2d 906, 920 (Mich. 1998) (Brickley, J., 
concurring); Id. (Mallett, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Id. (Cavanaugh, Kelly, JJ., 
dissenting); Trosper v. Bag'N Save 734 N.W.2d 704, 712 (Neb. 2007) (Gerrard, McCormack, Miller-
Lerman, JJ., concurring); Id. at 716 (Stephan, J., Heavican, C.J., dissenting); Kurtzman v. Applied 
Analytical Indus., Inc., 493 S.E.2d 420, 424 (N.C. 1997) (Frye, J., dissenting); Aberle v. City of 
Aberdeen, 718 N.W.2d 615, 623 (S. D. 2006) (Sabers, J., dissenting); Ford v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 
43 P.3d 1223, 1229 (Wash. 2002) (Chambers, Sanders, Ireland, JJ., dissenting); Bammert v. Don's 
Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, (Wis. 2002) (Bablitch, Bradley, JJ., Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
10. According to a survey of Clerks of Court for State Supreme Courts, most state supreme court 
decisions are unanimous. State Supreme Courts appear to have a much greater desire for unanimity in 
their decisionmaking than for example, the United States Supreme Court. State Supreme Court Clerks 
of Court estimate dissents to occur in only 2 percent to 10 percent of opinions. For example, the 
Georgia Clerk of Court, Bill Martin, reports that only 2.5 to 3 percent of cases have dissents, while 
Jason Oldham, the Clerk of the Kansas Supreme Court reported dissents on some issues occurring in 9 
percent of the cases. This survey, conducted by email by Professor Lea VanderVelde in late 2008, was 
not a randomized sample but a request for data from all State Supreme Court Clerks of Court. 
11. See, e.g., Anderson v. Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minn. Women's Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 
277 (Minn.2002) (Blatz, C.J., concurring); Chavez v. Sievers, 43 P.3d 1022, 1028 (Nev. 2002) (Rose, 
Leavitt, JJ., Maupin, C.J., concurring); Younker v. Easter Assoc. Coal Corp., 591 S.E.2d 254, 259 (W. 
Va. 2003) (Davis, Maynard, JJ., concurring). Such disagreement alone indicates that the law is not 
settled. 
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modified in later years only to be resurrected still later. Taking but one 
jurisdiction, consider the Wisconsin cases of Brockmeyer v. Dun 
Bradstreet, 12 Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hospital, 13 and most recently, 
Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 14 with its deeply divided majority and 
dissent. In Brockmeyer and Winkelman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
illustrated considerable yawing, first, in Brockmeyer, in a decision favoring 
employers in a four to three split, then, in Winkelman, in a decision 
favoring employees. This path, demonstrating considerable swinging back 
and forth in successive cases by the same court rather than a straight path 
toward a singular and coherent view of the existing doctrine and ending in 
a deeply divided decision in Bammert, evidences a court still attempting to 
seek an appropriate balance between competing interests and a background 
status rule that has not settled into any level stability. Such tilting back and 
forth is typical in the common law process when the law is still in the 
process of being worked out. 
Even within much narrower sub-topics of the common law of 
employment, like the legal significance of various modes of employment 
handbooks, sequential cases sometimes alternate between cases favoring 
employees and those favoring employers.' 5 This pattern suggests two 
possible dynamics: one that in the course of balancing interests the courts 
are engaging in a roughly intuitive split of the difference between the 
competing interests, or two, deciding courts are still attempting to find 
some middle ground of fairness between the competing interests, but have 
not yet drawn a clear conceptual line of where that proper balance exists. 
Thus, this pattern of decision-making is indicative of the fact that the at-
will rule is by no means "well settled," even within individual states. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly for a Restatement project of 
national scope, the fact that the same legal dispute would be handled under 
quite different theoretical exceptions in different states suggests that the 
law is far from stable among different states: that is, the judicial conception 
of what "at-will" really means is really framed by the exceptions that 
derogate from it; and as these differ greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
12. 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983) (holding in favor of the employer); Id. at 843 (Day, Callow, 
Ceci, JJ., concurring). 
13. 483 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1992) (six to one decision for employee). 
14. 254 N.W.2d 347 (Wis. 2002). 
15. The line of employee handbook cases in Iowa stretches from Cannon v. National By Products, 
Inc., 422 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 1988) to Kern v. Palmer College Of Chiropractic, 757 N.W.2d 651 (Iowa 
2008). These two cases, with five more in between, follow almost an alternating pattern of cases 
favoring employees followed by cases favoring employers. The result totals even out with roughly the 
same number of cases decided for each respective party. 
& 
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so, too, does the core conception against which these exceptions resonate. 16 
Consider, for example, the fact pattern of Murphy v. American Home 
Products.17 In Murphy, a long-time employee was fired in retaliation for 
truthfully whistle-blowing and was discharged in an abusive manner. Some 
states, notably California, would provide Murphy relief under an "implied 
in fact" theory of contract, providing good cause job security, given the 
length of his employment.18 Some states, notably Alaska, would provide an 
employee like Murphy relief under a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing rubric.1 9 Some states - probably the majority of states-would 
provide Murphy relief under a public policy rubric for his truthful whistle-
blowing activity. Still others would provide Murphy with relief for the 
abusive and undignified way that he was publicly treated as a criminal and 
his possessions were dumped out when he came to retrieve them, (notably 
Iowa, Texas, Oregon, and Arkansas).20 In other instances and in other 
states, promissory estoppel rules provide employees with cushions against 
the unjust harshness of the strict application of the at-will rule. 
The key outlier is the state of New York where Murphy continues to 
be the law.22 A true test of whether the strong from of the declarative 
provision of section 2.01 (that the employer "may terminate an 
employment relationship . . . without cause") continues to be the default 
rule in other states would be to determine where, other than New York, an 
16. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 193 (1991). 
17. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983). 
18. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Pugh v. See's Candies, 
171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981). As Pugh illustrates, a number of factors may be relevant to 
determining whether an employer and employee have varied at-will: duration of employment; positive 
job evaluations, promotions and commendations; lack of criticism; assurances; and the employer's 
policies including any contained in a written handbook. 171 Cal. Rptr. at 917. 
19. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1131 (Alaska 1989). 
20. See Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co, 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas law which 
would likely recognize this as the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Tandy Corp. v. 
Bone, 678 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1984) (recognizing that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress could be brought against an employer who was abusive in its interrogation of employee related 
to an investigation of theft); Hunter v. Bd. of Trustees of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 
1992) (recognizing cause of action for tortious interference with an employment contract where 
supervisor's conduct is improper and disrespectful); Bodewig v. K- Mart, 635 P.2d 657, 661 (Or. App. 
1981) (allowing a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress to limit employer's 
power over employee). Some states recognize abusive actions under a tort of outage theory. 
21. E.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981). If Murphy had been 
offered the job with certain "reasonable period" expectations on which he detrimentally relied, a firing 
early in his tenure for whistleblowing might trigger a promissory estoppel action in several 
jurisdictions, including Minnesota. This supports the broader point that tort, contract, and quasi-contract 
exceptions to at-will have continued to grow and evolve. 
22. Only the 1992 case of Wieder v. Skala, in which a law firm required an associate to violate the 
rules of ethics, has made a dent in New York law. Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 110 (N.Y. 1992). 
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employee in Mr. Murphy's circumstances would have no relief at all for his 
mistreatment. (There is little doubt that the weak form of the provision that 
an employer can terminate an employee at any time with cause is true.2 3 
Should the application of exceptions outnumber and outweigh the so-called 
default rule in the Murphy fact pattern, as we suspect they would, that 
declarative statement can no longer be said to be the norm in legal practice. 
That different states would provide an employee like Murphy with some 
significant relief, albeit through different avenues and different measures, 
suggests that the strong form of default rule stated in the document as the 
foundational premise of the proposed Restatement really only maintains in 
the state of New York. 
Thus, the nib of the issue with regard to the current version of the 
Proposed Restatement of Law section 2.01 is whether the strong form, the 
worst case scenario from the employee's perspective, continues to be the 
legally accepted one. Will courts outside of New York look the other way 
and deny good productive employees protection from malicious abuse of 
power? 24 We believe that this statement does not accurately reflect the 
current state of the law. We believe that most states do stretch those 
exceptions applicable in their states to bring justice into alignment with 
doctrine, resulting in a more nuanced legal reality. 
In other words, if state A "continues to adhere" 25 to the at-will rule but 
embraces a robust application of promissory estoppel, state B "continues to 
adhere" to the at-will rule but adheres to a robust application of implied-in-
fact contract terms limiting discharge, state C "continues to adhere" to the 
at-will rule but embraces the Restatement of Contracts' robust conception 
of good faith and fair dealing, and jurisdiction D "continues to adhere" to 
the at-will rule but applies an expansive notion of those circumstances that 
implicate the public good to constrain a dismissal, it would be misleading 
in the extreme to assert that all four "continue to adhere to the at-will rule" 
- which is just what the draft does.26 More than that, by decoupling "the at-
will rule" from the many and nuanced exceptions to it, the draft overlooks 
23. The only exception to this is situations that are true sinecures, lifetime employment without 
performance standards or performance expectations. 
24. One may legitimately ask why an institution would ever terminate a productive employee, but 
the fact narratives often disclose the reasons: other productive employees needing little training may be 
easily found and if an employee has crossed his immediate supervisor in some way, he may be subject 
to the supervisor's retaliation as a show of power. See, e.g., Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 
(Pa. 1974). 
25. Or, as an intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania tellingly put it, "[Pennsylvania] still 
clings to the at-will presumption." Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 834 (Pa. Super. 
1986) (emphasis added). 
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW app. to ch. 2 reporters' notes. 
) 
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the many state-specific hybrids that have been constructed to protect 
employees from the most severe, harsh and unjust results. By decoupling 
the rule from the exceptions, the draft marginalizes the significance of 
those exceptions. Only when one steps back from each of the discrete 
blackletter propositions to contemplate the structure of the draft as a whole 
does it become obvious how profoundly reductionist the draft's approach 
is. The draft first states the at-will rule declaratively and then narrowly 
cabins the exceptions, in the process, overemphasizing the scope of the at-
will rule and ignoring the multiple at-will hybrids that have evolved as 
functional doctrines of governing law in different states.27 
A similar exercise of application of state law could be done with 
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital.28 In Wagenseller, another 
factual pattern of employer overreaching which jarred customary norms of 
civil conduct, if it did not shock the conscience, the Arizona Supreme 
Court stretched available theories to nearly the breaking point to provide 
relief for the employee. Different states have developed their hybrids 
differently based on the order of cases that came before them,2 9 but 
harmonization between states' employment status rules has not yet been 
given the time to work itself through. 
It is in fact through sensational fact narratives, such as the abuse of 
employer power in the mistreatment of employees like Mr. Murphy and 
Ms. Wagenseller, that the old at-will rule is chipped away and reformed 
with the invention of new exceptions, the rationalization of the exceptions, 
and perhaps ultimately, if the common law is left to its own justice-seeking 
processes, various states will invent substitute rules that permit some new 
sustainable theoretical rubric across the various states. That moment has 
27. See, e.g., Crawford Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 554 (Colo. 1997) ("There 
is no doubt that implied contract claims based on employee handbooks are not classic contracts, but 
rather are hybrids arising from the application of contract and equitable principles, as well as common 
sense."); Decampos v. Kennedy Center, Inc., No. CV89 0260290 S, 1990 WL 264687, at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Nov. 21, 1990); Holtz v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 560 N.E.2d 645, 646 (Ind. 1990); Adams v. Inst. of 
Cmty. Servs., Inc., 727 So.2d 739, 743 (Miss. App. 1998) ("Wrongful discharge actions, not founded on 
some theory of contract essentially sound in tort, although some of the theories have attributes 
associated with both contract and tort" and describing these cases as hybrids (citation omitted)); Monge 
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1974); McConkey v. AON Corp., 804 A.2d 572, 594 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) ("Of the courts allowing recovery, many have adopted hybrid 
approaches which allow recovery for emotional distress in fraud actions under some circumstances," 
quoting Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 F.2d 859, 867-68 (Alaska 1999)); Reiss v. Players Guild of 
Canton, Inc., No. 2001CA00323, 2002 WL 501679, at *3 (Ohio App. Mar. 28, 2002) (Hoffman, P.J., 
concurring) (suggesting that the contract created a hybrid employment relationship); Groves v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 875 (Ohio App. 1991) (discussing three hybrids of tort 
actions employees could bring against employers for invasions of privacy); Wojciak v. Sec.-Peoples 
Trust Co., No. 1407-A-1983, 1984 WL 2219 (Pa. C.P. Erie County Jan. 26, 1984). 
28. 710 P. 2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). 
29. One could call this path dependency, as noted supra note 6. 
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not yet arrived. Seeking uniformity across state common law rules now can 
only be achieved by stripping back the employee-protective exceptions that 
have developed in most states. The core statement of section 2.01 having 
marginalized the many exceptions to a dependent clause remains a 
codification of nineteenth century understandings of the master's 
domination of the servant. 
B. Is Section 2.01 in Fact the Current State of the Law in American 
Jurisdictions and Is It the Best Articulation of the Current State of the 
Law? 
There are several reasons to believe that section 2.01 is not an accurate 
statement of law in the majority of states. As noted above, at-will may not 
be an accurate statement of the operative legal rule, in part because the 
many exceptions so dominate the jurisprudence in the area that there have 
rarely been recent judicial decisions completely non-suiting a productive 
employee who has been discharged in circumstances that seem manifestly 
unfair. Moreover, the structure of this declarative statement is flawed 
because it conflates two types of interests, termination with cause and 
termination without cause, and because it suggests a mutuality of contract 
between persons of notably unequal and asymmetric power in unilaterally 
terminating the relationship. 
First, if the proposed Restatement is seeking a common starting point, 
a much more accurate statement is that at-will was the dominant rule, rather 
than that it is the dominant operative rule. With the current state of the 
laws, composed of different hybrids in different states, and balancing and 
rebalancing competing interests as new cases arise in the same state courts, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to create a statement that is sufficiently 
accurate and unifying. At-will was the rule during a series of decades when 
collective bargaining was more prevalent and union density in the United 
States was higher. Currently, the at-will rule continues to be recited by state 
courts much as the common law origins of many archaic doctrines are often 
recited, but actually only as preambles to further judicial reasoning. 30 It 
would be a significant misinterpretation to claim that these recitations are 
30. For example, recitations of archaic principles of the nineteenth century doctrine of dower often 
precede modem rulings in intestacy or coverture discussed in modem divorce cases. See, e.g., Karsenty 
v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1167 (Md. 2008); Austin v. Austin, 100 So. 591 (Miss. 1924); In re 
Santelli's Estate, 146 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1959); Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Smith, No. 89738, 2008 
WL 2349289, *1 (Ohio App. June 10, 2008); Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 895-96 (R.I. 2006). 
Several cases stress the history of the at-will doctrine during the laissez-faire period of American 
business before turning to exceptions. See, e.g., Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 
1973 (Md. 1991). 
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actually being followed in cases where courts grant employees relief. The 
conjunction in the declarative sentence of "with or without cause" masks 
the fact that employers can always legally discharge an employee for 
cause. 3 1 To make section 2.01 useful in guiding the courts, the key point to 
be isolated is whether and to what extent employers can discharge 
employees without any rationale, reason, or cause, or for reasons that seem 
maliciously motivated. 
To support the premise that at-will is the rule in forty-nine 
jurisdictions, the Reporters have provided the ALI Council with a list in 
which various state supreme courts recite the nineteenth century 
formulation of the rule. Even among these cases, however, the courts do 
not always recite the phrase as it is worded in section 2.01. More 
importantly than the words used as preambles to judicial reasoning are the 
courts' orders. Many of these listed cases do not apply the declarative 
portion of the so-called "default rule," Instead they find for the plaintiff 
employee on one or another of the exceptions. Thus, in those cases where 
employees prevail, the more legally precise and analytically rigorous 
statement is that employers cannot terminate employees in those 
circumstances. Since an articulation of the at-will rule in such cases is not 
necessary to the case holding, it may properly be identified as dicta. 32 
More particularly, in Connecticut,3 3 Iowa,3 4 Minnesota,35 Ohio,3 6 and 
31. Even employees with express, bilateral employment contracts can be discharged for cause. 
E.g., Krizan v. Storz Broad. Co., 145 So.2d 636, 637-38 (La. App. 1962). Moreover, in some cases, 
recognizing cause for discharge is sometimes the easier decision. See, e.g., Phipps v. IASD Health Serv. 
Corp, 558 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1997) (holding no need to examine public policy exception where there 
was just cause to terminate an employee under an indefinite term). 
32. The cases that have been listed for each state in the Appendix, do not distinguish cases where 
the archaic rule of at-will was recited as compared to those where such a rule was followed, thus by 
better legal analysis, the cases in the appendix do not necessarily follow the rule and their recitations of 
such a rule are not necessarily holdings of the respective cases. 
33. Lingenfelter v. Gerald Metals, Inc., No. CV010181883S, 2002 WL 1491994 (Conn. Super. 
June 10, 2002). 
34. For example, in Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 741 (2006), a unanimous Iowa Supreme 
Court held that a jury instruction that a former employer had right to terminate employment of a former 
"at-will" employee at any time, for any reason, with or without just cause, was improper, prejudicial to 
the employee, and reversible error. 
Jury instruction no. 17 stated: The plaintiff was an employee at will with the defendant. 
This means that the employer had the right to terminate the plaintiffs employment at 
any time, for any reason, with or without just cause. Therefore, you need not decide 
whether the employer had just cause for terminating her employment. The mere fact that 
her employment was terminated does not establish her claim for damages. 
Jury instruction no. 17 was an inaccurate statement of the law because there are a 
number of exceptions to the at-will employee doctrine based on public policy and 
legislative enactment. 
Id. at 749. Additionally, in a line of cases, the Iowa Supreme Court has opined that the traditional 
doctrine of termination is now more properly stated as permitting "termination at any time for any 
lawful reason." Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Iowa 2000) (quoting 
103 2009] CRITIQUE OF RESTATEMENT CHAPTER 2 
Tennesee," recent cases hold that a jury instruction stating that the 
employer can fire for any reason or no reason is reversible error. The 
modem formulation seems to be that employers can terminate employees at 
any time for any lawful reason.3 8 Such a formulation does not overly 
constrain the common law from determining what is lawful. These 
reversals in phrasing occurring in individual jurisdictions invite a closer 
look at subtle changes occurring in other states, states that no longer honor 
the harsh application of the at-will rule, phrased as the default rule of 
section 2.01. "Any reason or no reason" is the functional equivalent of the 
Restatement's declarative statement, "with or without cause." 
On closer look, other states are pursuing other paths to reforming the 
common law by muting the application of a harsh result in circumstances 
where it would seem unjust. Quite recently a significant dissent in a case in 
the Maine Supreme Court urged that the state adopt the "implied in fact" 
contract theory as a basis for claiming wrongful discharge.39 What began in 
Pugh in California has been extended to describe certain additional 
wrongful discharge circumstances in Arizona, Idaho, and Washington 
State. 4 0 This recognition of employment security to some extent based on 
duration of service has a profound appeal as recognizing a long-term 
employee's increasing reliance on the particular employment relationship. 
This avenue of recognition could finally eliminate the ancient rule from its 
position of prominent recitation in those states. 
In yet a third group of cases, lawsuits against chief executive officers 
Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 577 N.W.2d 845, 846 (Iowa 1998)). 
35. "Unless otherwise agreed, an employment relationship is presumed to be 'at will,' which 
means that employment exists for an indefinite term and that both the employer and the employee 
remain free to terminate the relationship at any time and for any lawful reason." Alexandria Hous. 
Redev. Auth. v. Rost, 756 N.W.2d 896, 903 (Minn. App. 2008) (citing Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. 
Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Minn. 1986) and Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 
117 N.W.2d 213, 221 (Minn. 1962)). 
36. Schwenke v. Wayne-Dalton Corp., 155 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶60,589 (Ohio App. 2008) (citing 
Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint. Contractors, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990)). "Thus, the employer 
may terminate the employee for any lawful reason, and the employee may leave the relationship for any 
reason." Zajc v. Hycomp, Inc., 873 N.E.2d 337, 344 (Ohio App. 2007) (Gallagher, P.J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with the majority's result and arguing that termination was lawful). 
37. Watson v. City of Lavergne, No. M2006-00351-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1341767, at *1 
(Tenn. App. May 7, 2007). 
38. E.g., Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 275 (citing Lockhart, 577 N.W.2d at 846). 
39. Taliento v. Portland West, 705 A.2d 696, 700-06 (Me. 1997) (Lipez, Roberts, Dana, JJ., 
dissenting) (noting that at that time, thirty-eight jurisdictions had recognized implied contracts not to 
discharge except for cause in the employment context). 
40. Pugh v. See's Candies, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (App. 1981); see Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 
1138, 1143 (Ariz. 1999); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 108 P.3d 380 (Idaho 2005); Thompson 
v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087-88 (Wash. 1984) (holding that a handbook or other 
expression of policies that creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment can create that job 
security if the employee relies on that by continuing to work for the employer). 
& 
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and other employees for tortious interference with economic advantage are 
providing employees with cognizable causes of action even in 
circumstances in which a claim against the employer has settled or cannot 
be brought. 41 The success of these cases suggests that although the 
employee may not have some absolutely protected interest in his or her job, 
he or she has some relatively stronger protected interest against individuals 
who would intentionally interfere with such interests. Thus the employee 
has something akin to a relative protectable interest where tortious inter-
ference actions are successful. 
Second, by most reliable indicators, whatever the state of the law, the 
at-will rule can be predicted to change considerably in the years to come. 
Some of the predicted change is apparent from the multiplicity of dissents 
and concurrences. Over time one would expect some proportion of the 
seeds of argument found in the dissenting and concurring opinions to grow 
and blossom into new positions acknowledged by the majority.4 2 The 
distinctions in result and theory found in dissenting and concurring 
opinions grow into refinement from exposure to additional fact patterns in 
subsequent cases. 
Another method by which the nineteenth century version of the at-will 
rule is being reformed is by modern customary practice. A strict application 
of the outdated at-will rule (and the statement of a "default" in section 
2.01) is that an employee would receive no pay for one minute of the day 
after the announcement of the employer's decision to terminate that 
employee. Currently, the custom of most reputable employers is to pay the 
terminated employee at least until the end of the day on which the 
employee is terminated, and many employers pay terminated employees for 
the remainder of the week, two-week, or monthly pay period. This custom 
- that a discharged employee receives two week's severance pay - is 
becoming a commonly held customary expectation, even though it is not 
41. See, e.g., Stanek v. Greco, 323 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Michigan law); Dowd 
& Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 816 N.E.2d 754, 767-68 (Ill. App. 2004); Jenkins v. Parkview Counseling 
Ctr., 17 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 484 (Ohio App. 2001). Wilson v. Modjadidi, No, CL06-4670, 2008 WL 
5539824 (Va. Cir. Ct. Norfolk County Jan. 23, 2008); see generally Frank J. Cavico, Tortious 
Interference With Contract In The At-Will Employment Context, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 503 
(2002); John Alan Doran, It Takes Three To Tango: Arizona's Intentional Interference With Contract 
Tort And Individual Supervisor Liability In The Employment Setting, 35 ARIz. ST. L.J. 477 (2003); Elisa 
Masterson White, Arkansas Tortious Interference Law: A Proposal For Change, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L.J. 81 (1996); Mark R. Hinkston, Tortious Interference With At-Will Employment, Wis. LAW., 
Sept. 2001, at 14. 
42. For example, the common law evolution of the implied warranty of habitality in landlord-
tenant cases in the District of Columbia followed early dissents analyzing the unfairness of leaving 
vulnerable tenants without legal protection. See CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LEIBMAN, PROPERTY 
AND LAW 330 (2d ed. 1985) (detailing the common law shift from tenant's Caveat Emptor to the 
implied warrant of habitability in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (1970)). 
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legally required under the strict application of the at-will rule. Many 
employers believe that the good will created by such a custom assuages the 
unfortunate circumstance of discharging an employee, and employers will 
sometimes pay employees for unworked time even where cause exists for 
discharge, such as in reductions in workforce. That employers are engaging 
in the practice of paying employees some sort of severance even where 
they are not legally obligated to do so leads to an increased expectation on 
the part of employees to severance pay where the employer wishes to 
discharge but lacks cause to discharge an employee. Where employers 
revise employment practices by adopting customary procedures more 
generous than a strict application of the outdated rules, those outdated rules 
lack normative support. The position that severance pay has gained 
normative force cannot necessarily be tested through common law 
litigation because there is no opportunity to test the legality of a practice 
contrary to custom. Still, the operative application of the old rule, that an 
employer only need pay to the minute of discharge, erodes away, not 
through the kind of judicial reversal that can be found in a line of common 
law cases but by disuse and the shift in ordinary public expectation. 
Ironically, though custom and practice is a traditional legal means of 
implying contractual terms, the test of the draft Restatement ignores that 
traditional methodology and doctrine.4 3 
Yet a third reason to predict further cushioning of the harsh version of 
the rule derives from the current economic climate. Some theorist believes 
that legal regimes move toward greater protection of the weaker party in 
times of economic downturn. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to 
a greater cushioning effect for the weaker party in common law 
decisionmaking as well. During the economic bubble of the last two 
decades, the at-will doctrine was frequently commended as a public policy 
which was necessary to successful unbridled capitalism and economic 
growth.44 This justification for the at-will rule has apparently been adopted 
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06. 
44. See, e. g., Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 810 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Ark. 1991) ("It remains true that 
'the employer's prerogative to make independent, good faith judgments about employees is important 
in our free enterprise system,"') (citation omitted); E.L DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Pressman, 679 
A.2d 436, 448-49 (Del. 1996) ("The doctrine of employment at-will ... serves important social and 
economic goals. A significant erosion of the Doctrine could produce unacceptable costs in employment 
relationships."); Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 353 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Mich. 1984) ("[A]n 
employer's ability to make and act upon independent assessments of an employee's abilities and job 
performance as well as business needs is essential to the free-enterprise system."); Stein v. Davidson 
Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1997) ("The employment-at-will doctrine recognizes that employers 
need freedom to make their own business judgments without interference from the courts") (quoting 
Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn. 1997)). 
Some states enshrine the at-will doctrine as distinctively American and free from stricture. 
See, e.g., Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs, 845 N.E.2d 130, 136 (Ind. 2006) ("Employment at will is an 
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by the ALI Reporters without reflection and deeper consideration. The ALI 
Director expressed such a rationale in his recent remarks on why there 
should be an at-will rule and a Restatement of Employment Law. 4 5 If the 
ALI's justification for the at-will rule is grounded in economic analysis, the 
proposed draft should say so. Then the proposition would be open to 
debate with reference to the wealth of serious scholarly research and 
analysis about the argument's premises, which are by no means universally 
agreed upon by mainstream economists.46 
Moreover, industrial law and policy has long maintained that 
circumstances of economic downturn, reductions in force, and business 
closings are cause for discharge anyway. One may seriously wonder in the 
coming years whether the several state supreme court statements that the 
exceptions to at-will be narrowly construed will maintain in those cases 
where an employee is discharged without justification, not even the 
accepted just cause of the need for a reduction in force. Will the employer 
prerogative of being able to discharge a productive person without 
justification, other than the employer's ability to demonstrate power over 
the individual, continue to be seen as contributing to stable positive growth 
of the economy? Because the judicial opinions in the next few years may 
well need to adapt to economic change as, historically, judicial opinions 
have been swayed by the economic context, this is not the time to "restate" 
American doctrine, one that freed both employer and employee from the strictures of the English 
common law. English law presumed that employment contracts of unspecified duration were to last for 
a year."). 
45. "[T]here are essentially economic arguments for a fundamentally employment-at-will system 
that have so far prevailed in the legislatures and in the courts of almost all the states." Discussion of 
Restatement of the Law Third, Employment Law, 2008 A.L.I. Proc. 228 (comments of Director 
Liebman). 
46. See generally PAUL WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990). Professor Paul Weiler, looking at the economic arguments concluded that 
law should treat the sale of labor very differently from the way it treats the sale of fish or tomatoes or 
other goods: (i) employees lack adequate information about the incidence of unjust or frivolous 
discharges (hence they are in no position to "bargain" lower wages for higher job security even if they 
wanted to); (ii) they don't want to make this bargain for psychological reasons (humans don't usually 
trade present compensation to avoid the perceived low risk of a high severity event in the future); (iii) 
the Public goods problem - employers can't really provide for job security without a full program of 
progressive discipline, personnel documentation, recordkeeping, appeals, etc. - and all employees 
won't opt in because of free rider issues (unless you have collective bargaining); (iv) divided 
management - even if the informational, behavioral, and structural issues are overcome, and 
shareholders see it as in their interest to add job security to employment contracts, the firm's managers 
will resist to avoid bearing the direct costs of their own job reconfiguration - they don't want to spend 
all that time on monitoring and building paper trails, and they resent the loss of wielding unreviewable 
power over their subordinates, which can be overcome by paying management more (perhaps lots 
more) but that in turn helps make the employment contract even more unusual and the theoretical basis 
more questionable. See also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions ofLegal Protection in an At- Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105 (1997) (focusing on the 
information asymmetries between employers and employees). 
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employment law. 
C. Considering Section 2.01 as Phrased 
A structural fault in the phrasing of section 2.01 is its suggestion that 
the employer's prerogative to fire an employee at-will is the quid pro quo 
for the employee's ability to quit. Section 2.01 refers to both parties as if 
they stood in parallel equality of power or equality of legal right. On the 
contrary, an employee has a superior right to terminate his or her 
employment, based in the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.4 7 The employee has an unquestioned right to quit 
employment by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, whether he or she is subject to contract terms or not.4 8 An 
employee is recognized as having a right to quit whether he has received a 
contractual advance. 4 9 An employee may be obligated to pay back the 
contractual advance, and the employee may in some circumstances be 
liable for contractual damages for leaving off service, but the employee still 
retains a constitutional right to quit. An employer, on the other hand, has no 
concomitant absolute right to terminate an employee without regard to 
contractual or other limitations. Employers are prohibited constitutionally 
from requiring work from employees even in circumstances where an 
employee received an advance wage payment. 
Like other constitutional rights, the right to quit employment that the 
employee finds objectionable for any reason or no reason may be subject to 
time, place, and manner restrictions. Similar limitations exist for many 
constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech. An employee's right to 
quit may also possibly be countermanded for reasons such as national 
security.5 0 
By contrast, the Thirteenth Amendment does not give the employer a 
constitutional right commensurate to the employee's right to quit. There is 
no constitutional guarantee provided to an employer - the party who for the 
most part is in the position of greater power - to terminate an employee for 
no reason at all. The constitutional right to free association may be invoked 
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
48. Bailey v. Ala., 219 U.S. 219, 243-45 (1911). 
49. Id. 
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, 
A Lawyer's Worst Nightmare: The Story Of A Lawyer And His Nurse Clients Who Were Both 
Criminally Charged Because The Nurses Resigned En Mass 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQuY 317 (2009) 
(describing a flawed attempt to prosecute nurses who resigned en masse; the charges were dismissed 
because the nurses did not abandon patients, resigned at the ends of their shifts, and left no shift 
uncovered). 
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where an employee is a personal servant within the employer's household, 
but generally it does not extend to most large scale employment relations.51 
And in many industrial circumstances, employee reinstatement may even 
be ordered by courts.52 Given that employees have a right to quit, 
regardless of contract, status, or prior advancement of wages, a right that 
can only be countermanded by the greatest of national security arguments, 
insuring this constitutionally guaranteed right should not be thought to be 
the basis of a prerogative right vested in the employer. 
Thus, section 2.01 is structurally defective as written and should be 
divided into two sections to acknowledge the independent sources of the 
right or entitlement to terminate an employment relationship. Such a 
statement is more accurate and more in keeping with the prudential idea of 
transparency that a Restatement proposal to demonstrate the policies upon 
which a legal rule depends. 
Many statements of "at-will" also declare that employers may 
terminate without notice and without following any procedures. The 
failure to explore the expanded application of the at-will doctrine as a 
prerogative of contract, 54  means that the full power of employer 
prerogative is not exposed. In addition, the exceptionalism of the at-will 
doctrine is not brought to light in comparison with the termination law 
regimes of other nations. 
Default rules are not necessarily contract rules, they are as likely to be 
status rules, particularly where the parties have failed to engage in 
substantive negotiation. Consider the default rules of common law 
51. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
52. Reinstatement is a permitted remedy under Title VII and other statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000). And it has long been recognized as a legitimate remedy in 
arbitration. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 1236-43 (Alan Miles Ruben, ed., 6th 
ed. 2003). 
53. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right of 
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 68 (2000). 
54. See PHILLIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 122-23, 131 (1969); JAMES 
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 87-88 (1983). 
55. For example, the principal difference in termination law between the U.S. and Canada is that 
Canadian law requires reasonable notice for terminations not supported by good cause. See, e.g., Robert 
C. Bird & Darren Charles, Good Faith and Wrongful Termination in Canada and the United States: A 
Comparative and Relational Inquiry, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 205, 207-10 (2004). One significant document 
demonstrating how far American at-will doctrine differs from internationally accepted standards is the 
International Labour Organization [ILO], Termination of Employment Convention, ILO C 158 (June 22, 
1982), available at <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/ convdispl.htm> (scroll down to C158 and 
click). Another is the Canadian experience. CANADA LABOR CODE, R.S.C. pt. III (1985). A study by a 
national review panel of the functioning of the code found that providing an adjudication process for 
discharge for non-unionized workers was not necessarily costly, and indeed improved the quality of 
workplace conditions. FEDERAL LABOUR STANDARDS REVIEW, FAIRNESS AT WORK: FEDERAL LABOUR 
STANDARDS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 176-77 (2006), available for download at <http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=953049>. 
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marriage or intestate succession premised on what a decedent would most 
likely to have preferred had the decedent written a will.5 6 Of the many 
cases on the subject of employment at will, fully 2003 different cases 
include the word "status" in describing the employee's relationship. 
Employees who have not been able to bargain a contract that revises the so-
called default rule may in fact be in a dependent status relationship rather 
than a contractual one, because employment security in circumstances 
where a discharge is unmerited was never actually negotiated. 
The Comment to section 2.01 refers to the provision as a 
"presumption" and a "default rule."5 9 Although default rules generally do 
create rebuttable presumptions, the two things are not the same, and the 
proposed Restatement conflates rather than distinguishes them. "Default 
rule" describes the substantive principle, 60 and "presumption" describes the 
evidentiary effect that at-will has in litigation.6' Beyond the proposed 
Restatement, "at-will" often is referred to as a "doctrine." Part of the 
problem of articulating contract or relational principles in employment, is 
that "at-will" is never adequately explained and placed in context in 
employment contract law by section 2.01. It is variously considered by 
courts and commentators to be a default contract rule, an evidentiary 
rebuttable presumption, and perhaps even a substantive rule of employment 
law. This confusion and complexity give the doctrine some degree of 
56. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 71-157 
(2000) (treating intestacy as an "Estate Plan by Default"). 
57. E.g., Balmer v. Elan Corp., 599 S.E.2d 158, 232 (Ga. 2004) ("At-will employment is a bundle of 
different privileges, any or all of which an employer can surrender through an oral agreement. In 
addition to employment for a specified employment term or a for-cause requirement for termination, an 
employer can, for example . .. promise not to fire employees for a certain reason, thereby modifying the 
employee's at-will status.") (alteration in original, citation and emphasis omitted); Kamaka v. Goodsill 
Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 176 P.3d 91, 120 (Haw. 2008); Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. 2007); 
Taliento v. Portland W., 705 A.2d 696 (Me. 1997) ; Trosper v. Bag'N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704, 715 (Neb. 
2007); Aberle v. City of Aberdeen, 718 N.W.2d 615, 620, 621 (S.D. 2006) ("Aberle's status as an at-will 
employee" as compared to "[a]s evidence of his status as a contract employee"); Finch v. Farmers Co-Op 
Oil Co., 109 P.3d 537, 543 (Wyo. 2005). 
58. See Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An 
Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y 
J. 187 (1999). 
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 cmt. a, at 61; id. reporters' notes cmt. b, 
at 66. 
60. Default rules are substantive rules that act as gap fillers if the parties do not bargain around 
them. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection 
Clauses in Federal Courts, 82 TULANE L. REv. 973, 981-83 (2008). 
61. See FED. R. EvID. 301. Regarding at-will as a rebuttable presumption, see 1 HENRY H. 
PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.06 (5th ed. 2006); 1 PAUL H. TOBIAS, 
LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 4.1 (2003) ("[T]he 'at-will' doctrine establishes only a 
presumption that a contract of indefinite duration can be terminated at any time for any reason. As with 
any presumption as to intent, the at-will rule may be overcome by evidence that the parties contracted 
for some other arrangement."). 
110 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. I13:93 
mystique, but basically confound sound contract analysis or relational 
analysis. While rebuttable presumptions by definition can be rebutted by 
evidence to the contrary, in many states courts dealing with employment 
termination cases begin by stating that employment is at will and then 
require qualities and quantities of evidence to rebut it that plaintiff 
employees rarely can satisfy. Similarly, default rules apply unless parties 
bargain around them, but "at-will" is a default rule that is not likely to be 
displaced by bargaining for several reasons, including the following: 1) 
very little bargaining takes place in the formation of most employment 
relationships; 2) many employees are not aware of, or do not understand, 
the at-will default rule; 62 and 3) there is an inequality of bargaining power 
between potential employees and potential employers. One is left with the 
idea that at-will is either a rebuttable presumption that is almost irrebuttable 
or a default rule that tends toward an immutable rule.63 Section 2.01 does 
not capture the confusion and complexity of the law in American state 
supreme courts today. To be useful, section 2.01 should attempt at least to 
explain what it means to refer to at-will as a "default rule" or a 
"presumption." 64 Demystifying at-will would facilitate sound analysis. 
The draft's commentary states that "employment is a contractual 
relationship." 65 In fact, it is a most peculiar contract if it is entered without 
terms being specified and if the expectations of the parties to the contract 
with regard to termination are not the same. 6 Consider how unusual the 
resulting status arrangement is were it truly considered a contract. The 
Horace G. Wood at-will rule for contracts of indefinite term 67 sets up a 
"contract" that cannot be breached. It is the unbreachable contract. Can a 
relationship really be deemed a contract at all if it is unbreachable? There is 
nothing to hold the parties to, and thus designating the at-will employment 
relation as a contract does little except to insulate employers from those 
sorts of duties that strangers owe each other in tort. 
62. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does 
It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6 (2002). 
63. See Peter Linzer, "Implied," "Inferred," and "Impose": Default Rules and Adhesion 
Contracts - The Need for Radical Surgery, 28 PACE L. REV. 195 (2008). As Professor Linzer says of 
default rules: "[T]he very concept of default rules suggests a possibility of choice for both parties." Id. 
at 199. In most instances, it is improbable for an employee to bargain for written job security, despite 
expecting that it will come his or her way by fair dealing of his or her new employer. 
64. The Reporters' Note to Comment b repeats that At-will is only a rebuttable presumption and 
rejects case law that seems to treat it as something more. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 2.01 reporters' notes cmt. b. 
65. See Id. § 2.01 cmt. a. 
66. See Kim, supra note 46, at 147-55. 
67. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT: COVERING THE 
RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 273-74 (2d ed. 1886). 
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The Proposed Restatement comments list two justifications for the at-
will default rule. The first justification provides that "the rule reflects the 
background assumptions of the parties to the employment contract, and if 
the parties want a different rule governing termination they are free to 
negotiate it." 6 8 
This expression of the justification ignores many serious scholars of 
the subject, most prominently, the work of Paul Weiler 6 9 and Pauline 
Kim. 70 
The second justification made in the commentary is basically a non-
sequitur: "it reflects not so much the premises of the parties but, rather, the 
property rights of the employer, and for that reason any departure from that 
baseline should be bargained for, in the absence of a statutory or public-
policy restriction."7 1 
However, property theorists recognize that departures from baselines 
are adjusted by courts in the name of equity, asymmetric power relations, 
and changed circumstances all the time. One need only look at the history 
of the implied warranty of habitability in landlord-tenant laws,7 2 or the 
transformation of the waste doctrine 7 3 to see that modifications of property 
baselines are the assigned task of state supreme courts when they are 
engaging in modification to the benefit of the dependent party. The 
argument that the at-will rule is premised on a property right of the 
employer supports the idea that the relationship is a status relationship, a 
status relationship of dependency, and more particularly, a status 
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §2.01 reporters' notes cmt. a, at 65 (citing 
Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U.CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984)) The Reporters note 
that "[t]his rationale has been challenged by some writers who point to survey evidence that employees 
believe they have rights against termination without cause when in law they do not." Id. (citing Kim, 
supra note 46 and Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' 
Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447). The Reporters further note that "[o]ther studies emphasize 
the incidence of employment relationships reverting to at-will status in response to court decisions 
recognizing limits on termination without cause, as evidence that the agreements parties in fact reach 
correspond to the at-will default rule." Id. (citing Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics and 
Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1996)). 
69. WEILER, supra note 46. 
70. Kim, supra note 46. Although the draft acknowledges Professor Kim's work in this area, it 
does not suggest that employees' beliefs should have any effect on what the rule should be considered 
to be. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw §2.01 reporters' notes cmt. a, at 65. 
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §2.01 reporters' notes cmt. a, at 65-66. The 
only citation that the draft retains is for the counter proposition - William Gould's, The Idea of the Job 
as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU 
L. REv. 885 (1986). As the Reporters state, Professor Gould's article is antithetical to the claim that 
employers' are the ones with property rights worth protecting. Professor Gould argues that a job be 
considered the property of the employee rather than the property of the employer. 
72. See HAAR & LIEBMAN, supra note 42, at 294-324. 
73. See generally Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation Of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist 
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 563 ( 2006). 
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relationship in which courts should protect the dependent party because the 
dependent party lacks the ability to do protect himself or herself. 
II. SECTION 2.0274 
§ 2.02 Agreements and Binding Employer Promises Providing for 
Terms Other than At-Will Employment 
The employment relationship is not terminable at will by an 
employer if: 
(a) an agreement between the employer and the employee (1) 
provides for a definite term of employment, or (2) provides for 
an indefinite term of employment and requires cause to 
terminate the employment (§ 2.03); 
(b) a promise by the employer to limit termination of 
employment reasonably induces detrimental reliance by the 
employee (§ 2.02, Comment c); 
(c) a policy statement made by the employer limits termination 
of employment (§ 2.04); 
(d) the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing applicable to 
all employment agreements (§ 2.06) limits termination of 
employment; or 
(e) any other principle recognized in the general law of 
contracts limits termination of employment (§ 2.02, Comment 
d). 75 
Section 2.02 is about those contractual arrangements that modify the 
at-will rule set out in section 2.01. Accordingly, the black letter rule should 
set forth contractual modification, the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and promissory estoppel. It does articulate these grounds, but it 
fails to articulate contractual modification in a way that facilitates coherent 
analysis of how employment contracts that modify at-will employment are 
formed. Sections 2.02(a) and (c) are thus deficient. Although the Reporters 
state that the contractual variations set forth in section 2.02 are explained in 
more depth in sections 2.03, 2.04, and 2.05,76 the function of section 2.02 is 
the identification (or naming) of the contractual theories that can modify at-
will employment. Without a clear statement of the theories in section 2.02, 
sections 2.03 through 2.05 are not likely to succeed in providing depth and 
clarification. 
One of the distinctive features about employment contracts is the lack 
of formality and the lack of bargaining in the formation of most 
74. William Corbett is the author of the critique on sections 2.02 and 2.03. 
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.02. 
76. Id. cmt. a. 
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employment contracts. There is little law in the United States requiring 
specific steps in the formation of employment contracts. The employment 
relationship begins as it ends with few legal requirements and little 
formality, putting aside the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, for most jobs 
there is very little negotiation over terms, and often terms are not reduced 
to writing.7 7 Additionally, the terms of employment change over the life of 
an employment relationship. Given the lack of bargaining for employment 
terms at the commencement of the employment relationship and the 
changes that occur over time, the traditional bargained-for exchange model 
of contract law may be inadequate to describe many employment contracts. 
As many have suggested, relational contract theory 78 may provide a more 
relevant description of employment contracts. 7 9 Regardless of whether 
traditional or relational contract theory is applied, the analysis should take 
into account that in the employment context, rarely will there be a 
document that sets forth many or any of the employment terms.8 0 Thus, 
employment terms will be communicated in various ways at various times. 
Section 2.02 does not articulate a sufficiently detailed contract theory that 
takes this reality into account. 
Section 2.02(a) should state that employment contract terms that 
depart from an at-will relationship can be created by specific statements 
(written or spoken), nonspecific statements, conduct, or operation of law. 
By so stating, the section would recognize what are termed express 
contracts and implied contracts. This would be consistent with well 
established law8' and is accordingly reflected in the organization of 
contract law treatises, 8 2 employment law treatises, 83 and employment law 
casebooks.8 4 Instead, section 2.02, following the same faulty model of 
77. See, e.g., Carole A. Scott, Money Talks: The Influence ofEconomic Power on the Employment 
Laws and Policies in the United States and France, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 341, 354-55 (2006). 
78. See generally JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 8 (4th ed. 2001). 
79. See 1 PERRITT, supra note 61, § 6.02. The Restatement seems to be based heavily on the 
traditional model of contract law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03 cmt. a 
("The agreements that are the subject of this Section are based on consideration or bargained-for 
exchange."). 
80. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 747 (3d ed. 2005) ("Relatively few workers 
have individual written contracts of employment."). In contrast, laws in many nations require writings 
specifying certain agreed upon terms. E.g., Employment Rights Act (1996) §1.1 (Eng.) (requiring a 
written statement regarding particular terms within two months of an employee's starting work); 
Wolfgang Didubler & Qian Wang, The New Chinese Employment Law, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 
395, 396 (2009) (describing China's new Labor Contract Law, which became effective January 1, 2008, 
and requires a written labor contract and imposes penalties for failure to provide it). 
81. See, e.g., Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1985). 
82. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 1:5-1:6 (4th ed. 2007). 
83. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 80, § §9.2-9.5. 
84. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 5 
(4th ed. 2007). 
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section 2.01, begins with employment-at-will, rather than contract 
principles, and states that the at-will relationship may be varied by a 
definite term of employment or a requirement of cause for termination. As 
mentioned in the prior part critiquing section 2.01, this is an incomplete 
statement of at-will employment, and it is unnecessary to say that parties 
can agree to terms other than at-will employment. The drafters, by limiting 
the terms to which employer and employee can agree to "a definite term of 
employment" and a requirement of cause to terminate, foreclose the 
possibility of contracts terminable for other than cause, such as satisfaction 
contracts, or contracts not terminable at all.8  The issue for section 2.02 
should be how modification of at-will employment occurs. Sections 2.02(b) 
and (d) do specify legal theories, but (a) does not. 
Further muddling the organization of the section, section 2.02(c) 
specifies that "policy statement(s)" may limit an employer's power to 
terminate. Although employment law casebooks and treatises do indeed 
treat handbooks and employment policies in a separate subsection from 
express and implied contractual modifications, this separation unduly 
obfuscates the analysis. Handbooks and policy manuals have been found to 
contain statements that modify at-will employment; but this is only one 
way in which express or implied contract terms modify at-will 
employment. Express contractual modification occurs through fairly 
specific statements at variance with at-will employment. Implied 
contractual modification is more complicated and needs to be treated in 
section 2.02 in more detail. 8 6 Instead, "implied terms" is mentioned only in 
Comment f to section 2.03. Implied contracts and implied contract terms 
are used by courts and commentators to describe everything from 
nonspecific oral statements to implied-in-fact employment contracts, as in 
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.8 As Pugh illustrates, a number of factors may 
be relevant to determining whether an employer and employee have varied 
at-will employment: duration of employment; positive job evaluations, 
promotions and commendations; lack of criticism; assurances; and the 
employer's policies. Implied contracts have been recognized by courts in 
85. See Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377, 382 (N.J. 1988) ("[A] lifetime contract 
that protects an employee from any termination is distinguishable from a promise to discharge only for 
cause. The latter protects the employee only from arbitrary termination."); see also Mayerson v. 
Washington Mfg. Co., 58 F.R.D. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (contract for "reasonable period"). 
86. Professor Perritt explains the relationship between express and implied employment terms as 
follows in describing what he terms "implied in fact contract claims": "Although the promise of 
employment security often is express, communicated directly in a conversation with an individual 
employee, or stated in an employee handbook, its incorporation into the employment contract usually is 
implied." 1 PERRITT, supra note 61, § 6.06. 
87. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (App. 1981). 
88. Id. at 927. 
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many states.89 The failure to treat implied contract terms in some detail in 
section 2.02 renders this large and complex part of contract analysis an 
enigma under the proposed Restatement. For example, section 2.05 allows 
that consideration of an employer's course of conduct or the usage of the 
trade or industry can be looked to in deciding whether an employer 
commitment to an employee has "vested" and so is insulated from 
unilateral change. But section 2.02 declines to acknowledge that these same 
sources may be looked to in deciding whether a commitment to 
employment for a fixed term or for permanent employment should be 
contractually recognized at all, i.e., as implied in fact. Because it is not 
mentioned in a Restatement section, but instead is relegated to a comment 
to another section, the likely effect of the Restatement will be that courts 
consulting the Restatement will not find implied contracts. There is a large 
and complex body of case law that should be given a label in section 
2.02(a). Perhaps the answer of the drafters is that 2.02(e) covers it in the 
catchall "any other principle recognized in the general law of contracts." 
This is not an adequate answer. First, the meaning of the catchall section is 
not clear. Second, implied contract belongs with express contract as two 
ways to contractually modify at-will employment terms. If the drafters 
believe that implied contract is not well recognized, they should note that it 
is more broadly recognized than the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing recognized in 2.02(d). 90 Even New York, where the Court of 
Appeals has been reluctant to recognize judicially created exceptions to at-
will employment, recognized a version of an implied contract term in the 
context of a law firm requiring an associate to violate the rules of ethics.91 
89. See, e.g., Kingsford v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 247 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying 
Utah law and stating, "[a]n implied-in-fact promise to terminate only for cause can be demonstrated by 
'the conduct of the parties, announced personnel policies, practices of that particular trade or industry, 
or other circumstances which show the existence of such a promise,"' quoting Berube v. Fashion Ctr., 
Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989)); Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1101 (Cal. 2000) 
("The contractual understanding need not be express, but may be implied in fact, arising from the 
parties' conduct evidencing their actual mutual intent to create such enforceable limitations." (emphasis 
in original)); Hudson v. Village Inn Pancake House, 35 P.3d 313, 315 (N.M. App. 2001) ("Implied 
employment contracts have been upheld 'where the facts showed that the employer either has made a 
direct or indirect reference that termination would be only for just cause or has established procedures 
for termination that include elements such as a probationary period, warnings for proscribed conduct, or 
procedures for employees to air grievances."' quoting Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776, 
779 (N.M. 1993)). 
90. It should be noted that some courts have treated breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing as a tort theory rather than a breach of contract theory. See, e.g., Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
748 S.Wd 210, 212 (Tex. 1988); Metz v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 173 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 2007); 
cf ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Alaska 1988) That point would not be obvious 
from the placement of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this section. 
91. Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 110 (N.Y. 1992) ("valid claim for breach of contract based 
on an implied-in-law obligation in his relationship with defendants"). 
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If section 2.02 had clearly articulated express and implied contracts as 
ways of modifying at-will employment, then section 2.02(e) probably 
should have been omitted, as it is not helpful to say that there are some 
other contract principles limiting termination that the Restatement is not 
covering. 
Section 2.02 addresses the theory of promissory estoppel. 92 The 
section requires a promise to limit termination that "reasonably induces 
detrimental reliance by the employee." 93 To make the theory consistent in 
terminology with the theory of promissory estoppel articulated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 2.02(b) should use the term 
"foreseeably" relies rather than "reasonably" relies. 94 
The comments to section 2.02 would have been an appropriate vehicle 
to further explain and give examples of express and implied contractual 
modification of at-will employment. That is what the comments do with 
promissory estoppel in Comment c and the Illustration below it. Instead the 
comments recognize that collective bargaining agreements can and do 
modify at-will employment, but collective bargaining agreements are 
beyond the scope of the Restatement. 
What section 2.02 leaves us with is the promise in Comment a that 
subsections 2.01(a) through 2.01(d) are considered in depth in Sections 
2.03 to 2.05. As stated above, this is a problem because both promissory 
estoppel and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are 
clearly named in section 2.02, but the theories of contractual modification 
are not. We turn then to see if section 2.03 explains the contract theories. 
III. SECTION 2.03 
§ 2.03 Agreements for a Definite or Indefinite Term 
(a) An employer must have cause for termination of 
(1) an unexpired agreement for a definite term of employment, 
or 
(2) an agreement for an indefinite term of employment 
requiring cause for termination. 
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.02(b). 
93. Id. 
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) ("A promise which the promisor 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person 
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise.") (emphasis added). A comment to section 90 does state that the 
reasonableness of the reliance is one factor that may be taken into account in determining whether 
enforcement of the promise is necessary to avoid injustice. See id. cmt. b. However, Section 2.02(b) of 
this Restatement elevates the significance of reasonable reliance beyond that accorded to it in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
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(b) In the absence of an express agreement otherwise by an 
employee, the employee is under no reciprocal obliation to 
have cause to terminate the employment relationship.9 
Section 2.03 continues the problematic approach begun in section 2.01 
and carried into section 2.02: the focus is on at-will employment rather than 
employment contracts. Section 2.02(a) states that at-will employment does 
not apply if a contract provides for a definite term or provides for an 
indefinite term with a good cause restriction. 9 6 Although Comment a to 
section 2.02 said that section 2.02(a) would be considered in depth in 
section 2.03 , the text of section 2.03(a) adds nothing to it. 
If section 2.02 adequately had set forth contractual variation of at-will 
employment, the text of section 2.03 could have been devoted to the 
important issue of what constitutes good cause. Instead, the discussion of 
good cause is relegated to the comments. 
Section 2.03(b) states a reversal of the mutuality of obligation 
argument, that an employer is not bound by a term or by good cause 
because an employee is not bound. Mutuality of contract was a principle 
that provided there was no consideration to support a contract if the 
economic value given in exchange was much less than that of the promise 
or the promised performance; this "mutuality of obligation" was said to be 
essential to a contract. 9 8 The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts abandoned that notion, however, providing that "If the re-
quirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of ... 
'mutuality of obligation.' 99 
This draft Restatement provides that if an employer is bound, an 
employee is not similarly bound unless there is an express agreement. This 
provision seems consistent with the general criticism leveled against the 
requirement of mutuality of obligation.'00 The Comment on this principle 
adds that when an employee agrees to be bound, an employer seeking relief 
for a breach ordinarily cannot obtain specific performance, but a covenant 
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03. 
96. Id. § 2.02(a). 
97. Id. § 2.02 cmt. a, at 68. 
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. a. 
99. Id. § 79. Comment f to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts further provides: 
Clause (c) of this Section negates any supposed requirement of "mutuality of 
obligation." Such a requirement has sometimes been asserted in the form, "Both 
parties must be bound or neither is bound." That statement is obviously erroneous 
as applied to an exchange of promise for performance; it is equally inapplicable to 
[other contracts]. Even in the ordinary case of the exchange of promise for promise, § 78 makes it clear that voidable and unenforceable promises may be consideration. 
Id. § 79 cmt. f. 
100. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: 
RIGHTS & REMEDIES 14-17 (2d ed. 1993). 
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not to compete for a reasonable period is enforceable.'' A covenant not to 
compete is a separate agreement, which does not necessarily have any 
relationship to an employee's breach of her employment contract. The topic 
of covenants not to compete is simply out of place in this section or the 
comments thereto. 
Comment g notes that the black letter rule departs from the weight of 
authority by providing that good cause restrictions can be agreed upon in 
indefinite term contracts. This is a good result which follows the freedom 
of contract principle that parties can agree to anything that is not illegal or 
against public policy. A problem in Comment g and Illustrations 6 and 7 
that follow it is the failure to distinguish between indefinite term 
agreements, permanent employment, and lifetime employment. 102 A related 
issue that should be addressed by the Restatement is whether an employer's 
promise not to fire an employee, even for good cause, is enforceable. The 
moral hazard problem of employees with such assurances shirking has 
caused courts to infer a good cause term in such agreements.1 03 However, if 
the parties want to enter into such an agreement, there is no reason why the 
law should not recognize it. 
Comments h(i) and h(ii) provide different default meanings of good 
cause for definite term and indefinite term agreements. Economic 
circumstances of the employer can satisfy good cause for indefinite term, 
but not definite term agreements. No explanation is offered for this 
distinction. Comment h(iii) Illustration 8 uses material facts of Ohanian v. 
Avis Rent a Car Systems, Inc.,1 04 to illustrate that an economic reason is 
good cause for an indefinite term agreement. The illustration is problematic 
because the language used by the employer, "unless you screw up badly" 
should be interpreted as limiting good cause to reasons attributable to the 
employee, such as inadequate job performance or violation of rules, and not 
reasons attributable to the employer, like economic reasons or 
profitability.' This illustration seems to contradict the position in 
Comment h that "[t]he parties are, of course, free to define in the agreement 
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03 cmt. e. 
102. See, e.g., Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377, 382 (N.J. 1988) ("[A] lifetime 
contract that protects an employee from any termination is distinguishable from a promise to discharge 
only for cause. The latter protects the employee only from arbitrary termination."). 
103. See WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 84, at 99 nn.1-2. 
104. 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03 
reporters' notes cmt. b (identifying Ohanian as the source). 
105. Although the illustration does not identify Ohanian as authority for the proposition, if that is 
implicit and the Reporters' Note suggests this, it is misguided. Although Ohanian discussed whether an 
economic reason satisfied good cause, it was in the context of circumventing the statute of frauds to 
enforce an agreement. 
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their own special understanding of what would constitute cause sufficient 
to terminate the agreement without breach." 106 The cases cited in the 
Reporters' Notes to Comment h, particularly Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall 
International,107 grant broader discretion to employers in determining good 
cause when a contract is implied rather than express. This distinction is not 
exactly the same as the distinction drawn by Comment h between definite 
term and indefinite term agreements. 
Comment i states that if procedures are provided for in an employment 
agreement, they must be exhausted as a prerequisite to the employee's 
filing a lawsuit.10 8 The point seems misplaced. Section 2.03 is about 
contractual modification of at-will employment; thus, the creation of 
procedures as a contract term is relevant, but exhaustion of remedies is a 
different topic. The principle, appearing in Comment i, is dealt with too 
summarily. The final sentence of Comment i and Illustration 12 make the 
point that an employer that otherwise has stated a good cause should be 
required to apply the reason given in an even-handed, nondiscriminatory 
manner. 109 Both Comment i and Illustration 12 deal not with procedures, 
the topic of Comment i, but substantive good cause. 
IV. SECTION 2.04110 
A. Draft Restatement Position and Comment 
§ 2.04 Binding Employer Policy Statements 
Policy statements by an employer - made in such documents as 
employee manuals, personnel handbooks, and employment-
policy directives provided, or made accessible, to employees 
that, reasonably read in context, establish limits on the 
employer's power to terminate the employment relationship are 
binding on the employer until modified or revoked. 
Section 2.04 adopts the position that policy statements made in such 
documents as employee manuals, personnel handbooks, and employment-
policy directives that establish limits on the employer's power to terminate 
the employment relationship "are binding on the employer until modified 
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §2.03 cmt. h. 
107. 948 P.2d 412, 418-20 (Cal. 1998). 
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03 cmt. i, at 78-79. 
109. Id. § 2.03 cmt. i, illus. 12, at 78-79. It could be that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing would impose the same obligation of equal protection in an employer's exercise of its power to 
terminate an employment held at will. But the draft rejects that extension; again, without explanation. 
See the discussion of § 2.06, infra. 
I10. Stephen F. Befort is the author of the critique on sections 2.04 and 2.05. 
-
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or revoked."'" 
The Reporters' Notes explain that "[t]his Section adopts the position 
of the overwhelming majority of U.S. jurisdictions that unilateral employer 
statements can in appropriate circumstances establish binding employer 
obligations."112 Comment b asserts that "some" courts reach this result by 
applying unilateral contract analysis." 3 This Comment criticizes this 
approach as "a conceptually awkward fit" in that employees rarely are 
aware of the content of these statements when they accept or continue 
employment.11 4 Comment b goes on to state that "other courts, and this 
Restatement, rest the binding effect of unilateral employer statements on 
general estoppel principles.""'5 Making an analogy to "administrative 
agency estoppel," Comment b contends that when an employer announces 
unilateral statements intending to govern personnel policy matters, those 
statements should be binding on the employer until properly modified or 
revoked.116 
Comment c states that unilateral employer statements should be 
"reasonably read in context" to determine whether they have a binding 
effect." 7 This Comment references three factors that should be considered 
in this regard: the presence of a prominent disclaimer, the mode by which 
the employer disseminates the document, and whether the particular 
"workplace culture feature[s] dominant reliance on bilateral 
agreements."118 
B. Critique 
1. The Binding Nature of Employer Policy Statements 
Although some jurisdictions, such as Georgia, Florida, and Missouri, 
continue to view handbook pronouncements as mere statements of policy 
without any enforceable effect, 119 the Reporters' Notes are clearly correct 
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04. 
112. Id. § 2.04 reporters' notes cmt. a. 
113. See id. § 2.04 cmt. b. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. See id. 
117. Id. § 2.04 cmt. c. 
118. Id. 
119. See Quaker Oats Co. v. Jewell, 818 So.2d 574, 576-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Doss v. City 
of Savannah, 660 S.E.2d 457, 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 
S.W.2d 661, 661-62 (Mo. 1988). In addition, Montana has created a claim for wrongful discharge by 
statute which expressly preempts any claim for discharge that may arise from "express or implied 
contract." MONT. CODE. ANN. § 39-2-913 (2007). 
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in asserting that the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions recognize that 
provisions in employee handbooks and similar documents can be binding 
on the employer even though promulgated unilaterally.1 20  A few 
jurisdictions have suggested in dicta that unilaterally promulgated policy 
statements may be enforceable but have not addressed the issue squarely. 121 
Finally, New Hampshire has only found handbook provisions to be binding 
when collateral employment benefits are promised; it is unclear if a 
promise of job security is enforceable on the same grounds.1 22 
2. Rationale for Enforcement 
Although Comment b states that "some" courts employ unilateral 
contract principles in analyzing handbook statements,1 23 it is clear that the 
vast majority of courts that have recognized the enforceability of handbook 
provisions have done so on the basis of unilateral contract theory.1 24 In 
general, an implied-in-fact unilateral contract can be established if: "(1) 
[the] handbook is sufficiently definite in its terms to create an offer; (2) the 
handbook is communicated to and accepted by the employees so as to 
constitute acceptance; and (3) the employee provides consideration."25 
Most courts utilizing unilateral contract principles find that an employee's 
continued work performance after receiving a handbook or similar policy 
statement provides both the requisite acceptance and consideration to 
support a binding unilateral contract.' 2 6 
In contrast, only a handful of states rely on estoppel principles in 
determining the binding nature of employer policy statements.127 The 
Michigan Supreme Court has been the most influential proponent of this 
view with two landmark decisions: Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
120. See Jason A. Walters, The Brooklyn Bridge is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract 
Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree's Assent, 32 CUMB. L. REv. 375, 379 (2002). 
121. See, e.g., McCalment v. Eli Lilly & Co., 860 N.E.2d 884, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (declining 
to decide the issue of whether handbook provisions can modify the at-will rule); Neri v. Ross-Simons, 
Inc., 897 A.2d 42, 47-48 (R.I. 2006) (stating that even if it were to recognize the enforceability of 
handbook statements, the presence of a disclaimer foreclosed the possibility of such a claim's success in 
that instance). 
122. See Butler v. Walker Power, Inc., 629 A.2d 91, 93 (N.H. 1993). 
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. b. 
124. See Bruce Yoder, How Reasonable is "Reasonable"? The Search for a Satisfactory Approach 
to Employment Handbooks, 57 DUKE L. J. 1517, 1523 (2008); see, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 
71, 81 (Cal. 2000); Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms, Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 96-97 (Conn. 1995); 
Pine River State Bank v. Metille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffman- La 
Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1266-67 (N.J. 1982). 
125. Phipps v. IASD Health Servs. Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 203 (Iowa 1997). 
126. See, e.g., Metille, 333 N.W.2d at 629. 
127. Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect ofDisclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. 
L. J. 326, 344 (1992). 
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of Michigan,128 and Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co. 129 As the Michigan 
court summarized in Bankey, "written personnel policies are not 
enforceable because they have been 'offered and accepted' as a unilateral 
contract; rather, their enforceability arises from the benefit the employer 
derives by establishing such policies."1 3 0 Most states that use promissory 
estoppel analysis do so as a co-existing alternative to unilateral contract 
analysis, thus providing two possible justifications for enforcing unilateral 
policy statements. 131 
Comment b's endorsement of the estoppel rationale comes with some 
obvious advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, the esoppel 
approach arguably entails a more purposeful inquiry into the policy reasons 
underlying the enforcement of handbook statements. As one commentator 
has summarized: 
The promissory estoppel analysis offers two advantages in the handbook 
arena. First, promissory estoppel appropriately focuses on the legitimacy 
of employee expectations rather than on the somewhat fictionalized 
search for the contract law technicalities of acceptance and 
consideration. Second, promissory estoppel theory goes beyond the 
promise principle to consider explicitly the underlying equities or 
"injustice" of enforcement or nonenforcement. While the equity factor 
may well drive many of the handbook cases under either theory, 
promissory estoppel analysis does so openly and directly instead of 
covertly through a manipulation of other factors.1 32 
On the other hand, the draft Restatement's choice comes with three 
arguable disadvantages. First, the draft's adoption of the estoppel rationale 
does not simply restate or clarify the law; it instead seeks to alter existing 
law in most jurisdictions. Since the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions 
currently utilize unilateral contract principles in evaluating the 
enforceability of employer policy statements, the draft Restatement's 
rejection of that theory represents a significant departure from the existing 
legal landscape. A second potential drawback is that traditional promissory 
estoppel theory requires a showing of individualized reliance, and some 
courts have refused to enforce handbook promises where the employee in 
question has failed to prove detrimental reliance on specific handbook 
terms.1 3 3 This requirement imposes difficult proof problems and could 
128. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). 
129. 443 N.W. 2d 112 (Mich. 1989) (en banc). 
130. Id. at 119. 
131. See, e.g., Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 712 (Colo. 1987); Russell v. 
Bd. of County Commr's, 952 P.2d 492, 503-04 (Okla. 1997); Taylor v. Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 
466, 475 (Vt. 1993), Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089-90 (Wash. 1984). 
132. Befort, supra note 127, at 344 (citations omitted). 
133. See, e.g., Russell, 952 P.2d at 503-04 (finding a material fact dispute as to whether plaintiff 
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result in inconsistent levels of job security among employees covered by 
the same policy language. This drawback could be minimized by adopting 
the approach of those courts that dispense with the requirement of 
individual reliance in favor of a rule requiring only a showing of 
objectively established group reliance.134 Comment b's approving 
reference to notions of "administrative agency estoppel" may be consistent 
with the latter approach,1 35 but, as discussed below, this concept suffers 
from other infirmities. At a minimum, the drafters should make clear their 
position on this issue. Finally, promissory estoppel may provide a very 
limited remedy. Under traditional promissory estoppel analysis, a 
successful plaintiff is entitled only to recover damages incurred in past 
reliance as opposed to the anticipated value of future benefits. 136 
3. Contextual Construction - The Particular Importance of Disclaimers 
Comment c states that certain contextual factors may influence the 
enforceability of employer statements. As an example, the draft correctly 
points out that the mode of an employer's dissemination of a policy 
statement may inform the enforceability determination. 137 As the 
Reporters' Notes indicate, "some courts deny enforcement altogether to 
statements distributed only to supervisors."138 
In addition, courts generally will enforce only statements that are 
"definite in form" as opposed to mere "general statements of policy."1 39 As 
the Illinois Supreme Court has stated, a handbook statement, to be deemed 
an offer for unilateral contract purposes, "must contain a promise clear 
enough that an employee would reasonably believe that an offer has been 
made."140 
The most important contextual consideration concerns the impact of 
established element of detrimental reliance on provision in personnel manual); Stewart v. Chevron 
Chem. Co., 762 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Wash. 1988) (finding that plaintiff failed to submit proof of 
individual reliance on handbook layoff policies). 
134. See, e.g., Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W. 2d 112, 119 (Mich. 1989) (stating that 
handbook promises should be enforced if they benefit an employer by encouraging employee 
expectations that lead to an "environment conducive to collective productivity"). 
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. b, at 85. 
136. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Med. Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981); Goff-
Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, P.C., 588 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Neb. 1999). 
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. c, at 85-86. 
138. Id. reporters' notes cmt. a, at 87. 
139. Pine River State Bank v. Metille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626, 630 (Minn. 1983); see also Aberle v. 
City of Aberdeen, 718 N.W.2d 615, 621-22 (S.D. 2006) (ruling that a handbook can create an implied 
contract only if it embodies the clear intention of the employer to surrender its usual at-will 
prerogative). 
140. Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987). 
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disclaimers. Although they come in many different formats, the typical 
disclaimer is a provision within a policy document that states that nothing 
contained in the document should be construed as a contract and that the 
employment relationship may be terminated on an at-will basis. 141 
A substantial majority of U.S. courts find that a clearly stated 
disclaimer will serve to bar the enforcement of employer policy 
statements.142 This is particularly true in those jurisdictions employing 
unilateral contract analysis where a disclaimer generally is found to 
preclude contract formation as a matter of law. 143 In these jurisdictions, the 
disclaimer effectively negates any notion that a policy statement constitutes 
an offer such that the court can dispose of the employee's claim without the 
need for jury deliberation.1 44 
There are, however, some limitations on this general rule. First, courts 
generally will submit the issue of enforceability to the jury if the language 
of the disclaimer is ambiguous or if its placement is not conspicuous. 145 
Indeed, a few court decisions have gone so far as to find ambiguous 
disclaimers to be ineffective as a matter of law. 146 Second, some courts find 
an inherent ambiguity in handbooks that contain both specific promises of 
job security and a disclaimer that attempts to negate the enforcement or 
such promises.1 47 The outcome in these cases is for the ambiguity to be 
resolved by a jury rather than the court.1 48 
Those jurisdictions that utilize promissory estoppel principles apply a 
somewhat different analysis. In many instances, courts in these 
141. See Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer as an Effective Means to Define the 
Employment Relationship, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 365, 386-87 (1989). 
142. See Yoder, supra note 124, at 1535, see, e.g., Massey v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 917 
So.2d 833, 841 (Ala.Civ. App. 2005); Boulton v. Inst. of Int'l Educ., 808 A.2d 499, 505 (D.C. 2002); 
Phipps v. IASD, 558 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Iowa 1997). 
143. See, e.g., Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 401-02 (Utah 1998); Bouwens v. 
Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 946-47 (Wyo. 1999). 
144. See Befort, supra note 127, at 348-49; Yoder, supra note 124, at 1535. 
145. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Host Int'l, Inc., 757 N.E.2d 267, 271-72 (Mass. App. 2001); Williams v. 
Precision Coil, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 329, 341-42 (W.Va. 1995); Clay v. Horton Mfg. Co. Inc., 493 N.W.2d 
379, 382 (Wis. App. 1992). 
146. See, e.g., Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989); Hicks v. 
Methodist Med. Ctr., 593 N.E.2d 119, 121-22 (Ill. App. 1992); Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 
643A.2d 554, 561-62 (N.J. 1994). 
147. See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1103-04 (Cal. 2000) (finding a question of 
fact with respect to the effect of a disclaimer "where other provisions in the employer's personnel 
documents themselves suggest limits on the employer's termination rights"); Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 
450 S.E.2d 589, 596 (S.C. 1994) (ruling that a disclaimer is merely one factor in ascertaining whether 
handbook as a whole conveys enforceable promises); Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703, 
707 (Vt. 2002) (finding ambiguity despite a disclaimer where language of the handbook and employer 
action indicated intent to create a contract) 
148. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1103-04; Fleming, 450 S.E.2d at 596; Dillon, 819 A.2d at 707. 
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jurisdictions find as a matter of law that a clear and conspicuous disclaimer 
negates the existence of a promise on which employees reasonably may 
rely.1 49 In other instances, however, courts applying estoppel theory find 
that a disclaimer does not automatically foreclose enforceability, but 
instead is just one piece of evidence for a jury to consider in determining 
whether a policy statement, taken as a whole, reasonably induced the work 
force to rely on its terms.' 50 The Colorado Court of Appeals in Cronk v. 
Intermountain Rural Electric Association,"' for example, ruled that an 
employee is entitled to enforce a handbook promise, notwithstanding the 
presence of a disclaimer, if it can be shown that: 
The employer should reasonably have expected the employee to consider 
the manual as a commitment from the employer to follow the 
termination procedures, that the employee reasonably relied upon the 
termination procedures to his detriment, and that injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the termination procedures. 52 
The task of the jury in these cases, accordingly, is not to resolve ambiguous 
policy language, but to determine the reasonable expectations that such 
language generates. 153 
It is not clear what weight the draft Restatement gives to disclaimers. 
Comment b states that the presence of a prominent disclaimer may indicate 
that a policy statement is only "hortatory" in nature, but that the broader 
context of the statement and other employer policies may indicate 
otherwise. 154 This sheds little light on such an important issue. Under 
prevailing handbook jurisprudence, the presence of a clear and conspicuous 
disclaimer generally will negate the enforcement of most employer policy 
statements.1 55 Given that reality, it is inadequate for Section 2.04 to 
proclaim that employer policy statements generally are binding when, in 
fact, they are not. And, significantly, many commentators maintain that 
employment policy is ill-served by a legal rule that gives preclusive effect 
to boilerplate disclaimers without regard to the actual expectations created 
by employer policy statements.' 5 6 The proposed Restatement, in short, 
149. See, e.g., Lytle v. Malady, 579 N.W.2d 906, 911-12 (Mich. 1998). 
150. See, e.g., Allabashi v. Lincoln Nat'l Sales Corp., 824 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. App. 1991); Haselrig v. 
Pub. Storage, Inc., 585 A.2d 294, 299-300 (Md. Spec. App. 1991). 
151. 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1988). 
152. Id. at 624. 
153. See Befort, supra note 127, at 366-67. 
154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. b. 
155. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 
156. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 127, at 372-76; Estlund, supra note 62, at 19-20; Matthew W. 
Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 733, 
751-52 (1986); Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual 
Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082, 1106-07 (1984); 
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needs to address how disclaimers actually impact and should impact the 
ultimate enforceability determination. 
Having endorsed the estoppel approach to handbook enforcement, a 
key question is whether the Restatement similarly endorses an estoppel 
approach to disclaimer analysis. If so, one would assume that the presence 
of a disclaimer would not automatically defeat handbook enforcement - the 
usual unilateral contract result - but instead would serve only as a factor in 
determining the appropriateness of collective reliance on handbook 
statements. This, of course, would entail a more fact-intensive examination 
that in many instances would not be appropriate for resolution via summary 
judgment. Whether or not this is the intent, the proposed Restatement 
should explicitly deal with the crucial impact of disclaiming language. 157 
V. SECTION 2.05 
A. Draft Restatement Position and Comment 
§ 2.05 Modification or Revocation of Binding Employer Policy 
Statements 
(a) An employer may modify or revoke its binding policy 
statement by providing reasonable notice of the modified 
statement or revocation to the affected employees. 
(b) Modifications and revocations apply to all employees hired, 
and all employees who continue working, after the effective date 
of the notice of modification or revocation. 
(c) Modifications and revocations cannot adversely affect vested 
or accrued employee rights that may have been created by the 
statement, an employment agreement based on the statement 
(covered by § 2.03), or reasonable detrimental reliance on a 
promise in the statement (covered by § 2.02(c)). 158 
Section 2.05 adopts the position that an employer may modify or 
revoke a previously issued and binding policy statement by providing 
reasonable notice of the change so long as such action does not adversely 
affect vested or accrued employee rights. 
Comment e to section 2.05 notes that the courts are split with respect 
to an employer's ability to modify existing policy statements, stating that 
"[a] number of courts have held that employees who continue to work for 
Yoder, supra note 124, at 1535-36. 
157. In addition, the draft Restatement does not address the broader problem of how to weigh 
disclaimer language in other employment-related documents such as job applications and job offer 
letters. 
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05. 
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the employer after receiving proper notice of a modification or revocation 
of a unilateral employer statement . . . are deemed to have 'accepted' the 
changed personnel policy."15 9 At the same time, Comment e notes that "[a] 
roughly equal number of courts have held that a changed personnel policy 
covers only those incumbent employees who have expressly agreed to the 
change." 16 0 Comments d and e endorse the former view, asserting that an 
employer should be entitled to alter existing documents by providing the 
same or substantially equivalent notice as was provided when the prior 
documents were disseminated.' 6 1 In terms of rationale, Comment a states 
that "[i]t is not reasonable to assume that an employer intended 
permanently to circumscribe its operational policies through such non-
bargained-for [unilateral statements]."1 6 2 In addition, Comment e contends 
that permitting employers to alter policy statements only by means of a 
bilateral agreement is contrary to the equitable estoppel grounds that the 
Restatement recognizes as the basis for enforcing such statements. 16 3 
B. Critique 
1. Two Conflicting Views 
a. Majority View 
According to the scholarly commentary, a clear majority of the states 
find that an employer may modify or revoke previously issued policy 
statements on a unilateral basis.164 These jurisdictions take the position that 
an employee's continuing to work after receiving notice of the change 
constitutes acceptance and consideration just as it did for the previously 
issued document. 16 5 In essence, these courts adopt a "reverse" unilateral 
contract analysis, concluding that since the employer created the binding 
document unilaterally, it may also terminate or modify the resulting 
obligation in the same manner. 16 6 As summarized by the Supreme Court of 
159. Id. § 2.05 cmt. e, at 92. 
160. Id. 
161. See id. § 2.05 cmts. d-e, at 92-93. 
162. Id. § 2.05 cmt. a. 
163. See id. § 2.05 cmt. e, at 92-93. 
164. See Brian T. Kohn, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers from Unilaterally 
Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 799, 819 (2003); Walters, 
supra note 120, at 387; Yoder, supra note 124, at 1527. 
165. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. 2000); Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 
431 N.W.2d 296, 298 (N.D. 1988); Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 589, 594-95 (S.C. 1994); Ryan 
v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc, 972 P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998). 
166. See Befort, supra note 127, at 357-58; Kohn, supra note 164, at 819. 
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California, requiring actual assent "would incorrectly impose a bilateral 
principle on the unilateral relationship, leaving the employer unable to 
manage its business, impairing essential managerial flexibility, and causing 
undue deterioration of traditional employment principles." 167 
Courts applying the majority rule generally place two limits on an 
employer's ability to unilaterally withdraw or alter previously-issued policy 
statements. First, these courts require that the employer provide affected 
employees with reasonable notice of the alteration.1 68 There is, however, no 
well-accepted understanding of what type of notice is "reasonable." Some 
courts find that constructive notice is sufficient, such that the dissemination 
of a revised handbook itself constitutes reasonable notice.1 69 Some other 
courts require more in the way of actual notice that specifically references 
the key alterations.' 70 Meanwhile, a few courts, most notably the California 
Supreme Court in Asmus v. Pacific Bell, appear to require a period of 
advance notice before an announced alteration may take effect.171 
As a purported second limitation, these courts frequently state that an 
employer's modification of a previously existing policy may not interfere 
with any rights that may have vested under the prior policy. 7 2 This rule 
occasionally has been invoked to bar an employer from refusing to provide 
a benefit, such as accrued vacation pay, that an employee has fully earned 
under a pre-existing policy.1 7 3 But, this notion has no real meaning with 
respect to unilateral policy statements that provide for some limitation on 
the at-will dismissal presumption. Since the majority rule recognizes an 
employer's right to rescind such policies on a unilateral basis, such 
employment security rights never truly vest. 174 In practical effect, 
accordingly, the majority view forecloses any possibility of a claim based 
on the vesting of a promise of job security. 
167. Asmus, 999 P.2d at 78 (citing Demasse v. ITT Corp, 984 P.2d 1138, 1155 (Ariz. 1999) (J. 
Jones, dissenting)). 
168. See Walters, supra note 120, at 387; Yoder, supra note 124, at 1533. 
169. See, e.g., Elliott v. Bd. of Trustees, 655 A.2d 46, 51-52 (Md. Spec. App.1995) (finding that 
employer's dissemination of amended policies and procedures manual without explanation constituted 
sufficient notice). 
170. See, e.g., Fleming v. Borden, 450 S.E.2d 589, 595-96 (S.C. 1994) (requiring that employer 
provide actual notice to employee of modification of previously binding handbook). 
171. 999 P.2d 71, 80 (Cal. 2000) (finding that employer that gave five months notice before revised 
policy took effect provided employees with "ample advance notice"). 
172. See, e.g., id. at 76. 
173. See, e.g., Amoco Fabrics & Fiber Co., v. Hilson, 669 So.2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1995) (vacation 
pay); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 777 (Ohio App. 1984) (severance pay). 
174. See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 79 (stating that "no court has treated an employment security policy as 
a vested interest for private sector employees") 
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b. Minority View 
A smaller number of courts take a more restrictive view and find that 
an employer can modify the terms of a binding unilateral policy only upon 
obtaining the mutual assent of covered employees and/or by providing 
additional consideration.17 5 These courts reason that since the employee 
already possesses contractual rights flowing from the initial handbook, an 
employer's attempted modification that seeks to circumscribe those rights 
should be effective only if it satisfies the elements of a new bilateral 
contract. 176 These courts contend that an employee's continuing to work is 
insufficient consideration in this context since the requisite consideration 
should benefit the employee who is relinquishing rights rather than the 
employer who is gaining rights. 177 They find that the majority rule, in 
contrast, places an employee in an impossible bind. As the Connecticut 
Supreme Court has stated: "[t]he employee's only choices [when presented 
with a modified document] would be to resign or to continue working, 
either of which would result in the loss of the very right at issue - that is, 
the loss of the right to retain employment until terminated for cause." 7 8 
2. Scholarly Commentary 
The scholarly commentary rather strongly disfavors the majority view. 
The range of opinion expressed by the academy on this issue falls along the 
following spectrum: 1) those that favor the minority view as best 
embodying pertinent contract law principles;' 7 9 2) those that believe that 
modification attempts should be evaluated under the basic estoppel 
principle of whether the modified document nonetheless generates 
reasonable employee expectations; 1 80 and 3) those that believe that an 
employer should be able to modify or revoke policy statements with a 
175. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Ariz. 1999) (requiring mutual assent 
and additional consideration); Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 
1995) (requiring mutual assent); Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1145 (Ill. 1999) 
(requiring additional consideration); Brodie v. Gen. Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1268 (Wyo. 1997) 
(requiring mutual assent and additional consideration). 
176. See Thompson v. King's Entm't Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (E.D. Va. 1987); Befort, supra 
note 127, at 359-60. 
177. See, e.g., Doyle, 708 N.E.2d at 1145 (stating "[b]ecause the defendant was seeking to reduce 
the rights enjoyed by the plaintiffs under the employee handbook, it was the defendant, and not the 
plaintiffs, who would properly be required to provide consideration for the modification"). 
178. Torosyan, 662 A.2d at 99. 
179. See Kohn, supra note 164, at 804-05; Richard J. Pratt, Unilateral Modification of Employment 
Handbooks: Further Encroachments on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 197, 221 
(1990); Stephen Carey Sullivan, Unilateral Modification of Employee Handbooks: A Contractual 
Analysis, 5 REGENT U. L. REv. 261, 293 (1995). 
180. See Befort, supra note 127, at 377-78. 
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reasonable period of advance notice ranging from a minimum of one week 
to a maximum of three months for those revisions that seek to extinguish a 
previously existing promise of job security.'s8 
3. Restatement Rationale 
Section 2.05 adopts the prevailing majority view and recognizes an 
employer's authority to repudiate prior policy statement pronouncements 
on a unilateral basis.1 82 The only limitation on this authority is that the 
employer must provide reasonable advance notice to affected employees in 
at least the same or substantially equivalent manner that gave rise to the 
earlier obligation. 183 Thus, an employer that distributed its initial policy 
manual without explanation would be free to do the same in revoking or 
modifying representations contained in the earlier document. 
Comment e to Section 2.05 offers two justifications for the adoption 
of this position. First, Comment e states that "requiring express agreement 
by employees to changes in employer statements would be unworkable for 
companies with large workforces." 184 Two commentators have offered 
competing views on this issue. Bruce Yoder, in a 2008 article, provides 
general support for the justification offered by Comment e in the following 
passage: 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against requiring additional 
consideration is that proscribing unilateral modification of handbooks 
would be an unwieldy and impractical policy for employers to 
implement. Such a rule would become a logistical nightmare, as a 
company manual "could never be changed short of successful 
renegotiation with each employee who worked while the policy was in 
effect." Problems with holdouts, dates of hiring, and various manuals 
that had been previously issued would mean that employers could have 
drastically different obligations to many different employees.18 5 
In contrast, Professor Matthew Finkin argues that the concern that an 
employer may end up with potentially different obligations owing to 
different employees is over-stated. He writes: 
[E]mployers seem to have no difficulty today in freezing their 
guaranteed benefits pension plans vis-h-vis incumbent workers and 
hiring new workers under defined contribution plans (sometimes 
employer non-contributory) or affording them no pension benefits at all. 
Nor are employers apparently troubled by having the same work done in 
181. See Yoder, supra note 124, at 1539. 
182. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05. 
183. See id. § 2.05 cnt. d. 
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 cmt. e, at 93. 
185. Yoder, supra note 124, at 1531 (quoting Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 120 
(Mich. 1989)). 
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the same workplace by both regular and agency workers who work side-
by-side under vastly different wage and benefits policies. Uniformity of 
treatment does not seem to be of much concern to employers in these 
cases. It is never explained [in the draft Restatement] why uniformity of 
treatment should drive in the opposite direction when it comes to job 
-186
security. 
Comment e also contends that requiring employers to obtain a 
bilateral agreement to modify or revoke a unilateral policy statement is 
contrary to the equitable estoppel basis for enforcing such statements. 87 
Some support for this view is provided by the analysis of the Michigan 
Supreme Court in Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Company.'8 8 In that case, 
the court considered a certified question asking whether an employer could 
replace a discharge-for-cause policy statement with an at-will policy on a 
unilateral basis. 189 In addressing this issue, the court surveyed the various 
theoretical bases for enforcing policy statements and concluded that 
enforceability in Michigan "arises from the benefit the employer derives by 
establishing such policies," namely by fostering employee expectations that 
"promote an environment conducive to collective productivity."1 90 The 
court, applying this estoppel-like standard, found that when an employer 
revokes an earlier policy by eliminating promissory language, "the 
employer's benefit is correspondingly extinguished, as is the rationale for 
the court's enforcement of the discharge-for-cause policy."' 9' Thus, 
handbook modification should be permissible, even on a unilateral basis, if 
the employer also rescinds the source of its potential benefit. 
The Bankey logic, however, does not necessarily extend to handbook 
modifications as opposed to handbook revocations. Take, for example, the 
case of an employer that seeks to modify a policy statement containing 
representations of job security through the addition of a disclaimer. If the 
new document contains both specific promises of job security as well as a 
disclaimer, the benefit to the employer is not necessarily extinguished. In 
this instance, the employees may conclude that the new handbook, read as 
a whole, continues to offer a credible promise of job security.192 In this 
context, as discussed above, a number of courts applying estoppel 
principles would find a jury question as to the reasonable expectations 
186. Matthew W. Finkin, Shoring Up the Citadel (At-Will Employment), 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 1, 11-12 (2006) (citations omitted). 
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 cmt. e, at 92. 
188. 443 NW. 2d 112 (Mich. 1989) (en banc). 
189. Id. at 117. 
190. Id. at 119. 
191. Id. 
192. See Befort, supra note 127, at 377; Pratt, supra note 179, at 223. 
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generated by the document's overall tenor. 193 
The likely retort from the drafters of Section 2.05 to such criticism is 
that the Bankey rationale is not the type of "equitable estoppel" that they 
have in mind. As Comment e notes, the equitable estoppel basis for policy 
statement enforcement differs from "traditional contract principles of 
consideration, bargained-for exchange, or even promissory estoppel." 194 
Instead, the equitable estoppel basis for enforcement likely refers to the 
"administrative agency estoppel" concept discussed in comment b to 
Section 2.04.195 Under that theory, procedural rules promulgated by an 
administrative agency are binding on the agency while in effect, but the 
agency may modify or revoke those rules on a unilateral basis going 
forward subject only to the provision of reasonable notice. 196 
The analogy to administrative agency estoppel may be subject to at 
least two criticisms in the context of employer policy statements. First, no 
jurisdiction has adopted administrative agency estoppel as the underlying 
rationale for enforcing employer policy statements. As such, the draft 
Restatement here again proposes to change rather than to restate or clarify 
existing law. 
Second, it is not clear that the rules governing administrative agency 
procedure are comparable in nature to the rules governing the substance of 
the employment relationship. While a procedural rule in an agency context 
serves to provide guidance on the process of how an agency intends to 
determine substantive rights going into the future, a promissory statement 
made in the context of an ongoing employment relationship itself directly 
establishes the substantive rules governing that relationship. In some 
employment contexts, such as in the realm of procedural due process rights 
afforded by the Constitution to public employees, an employer's 
unilaterally promulgated rules and even practices have been found to be 
binding and not subject to unilateral alteration. 197 Further, promissory 
employer policy statements frequently foster expectations about future 
treatment. As Professor Finkin has stated in criticism of the Restatement's 
analogy to administrative agency estoppel: 
This logic elides the fact that the loyalty the employer's policy sought to 
instill rested upon creating reasonable employee expectations about how 
they will be treated in the future. The labor of a human being is a non-
durable good. The individual's dwindling supply is expended, other 
193. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. 
194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 cmt. e, at 92-93. 
195. See id. § 2.04 cmt. b, at 85. 
196. See id. 
197. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972). 
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opportunities ignored or foregone, at least partly because of the 
expectation of fair treatment the employer has engendered. If expectation 
of deferred income could estop the employer from abrogating 
retroactively its commitment to severance pay, it would seem much the 
same should apply in the matter of job security; or, less strongly, that the 
draft rather badly needs to explain why it would not, reason other than 
that abrogability better serves an employer's interest. 
VI. SECTION 2.06199 
§ 2.06: The Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
(a) Every employment contract imposes on each party a non-
waivable duty of good faith and fair dealing, which includes an 
agreement by each not to hinder the other's performance 
under, or to deprive the other of the benefit of, the contract. 
(b) In at-will employment, the implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing must be read consistently with the at-will nature of 
the relationship. 
(c) In any employment relationship, including at-will, the 
employer's implied duty of good faith and fair dealing includes 
the duty not to terminate or seek to terminate the employment 
relationship in order 
(1) to prevent the vesting or accrual of an employee right or 
benefit, or 
(2) to retaliate against the employee for performing the 
emplgee's obligations under the employment contract or 
law. 
The defects of the proposed Restatement are well evidenced in its 
treatment of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing: the want of depth 
in scholarship; the lack of conceptual coherence; the absence of analysis, of 
any reasoned explanations for the choices it makes; and the blunting effect 
of the blackletter rules it proposes on the potential for the growth of law. 
Each of these will be documented below. But first the basic thrust of the 
provision should be outlined. 
The proposed section 2.06(a) asserts that every contract of 
employment, including an employment that is held at will, contains (the 
draft says "imposes") a non-waiveable duty of good faith and fair dealing 
on both parties. This proposition is consistent with the position taken in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.201 Although the Reporters' Notes do 
198. Finkin, supra note 186, at 12. 
199. Matthew W. Finkin is the author of the critique of section 2.06. 
200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06. 
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205. 
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not dwell on it, the draft would appear to be a progressive departure from 
the legal status quo in those jurisdictions where courts have, thus far, been 
reluctant to recognize such an obligation, insofar as at-will employment is 
concerned.20 2 That declination proceeds from a perception that inasmuch as 
the at-will rule might license the employer to discharge for any reason, 
even an arbitrary, malicious, duplicitous, or other morally squalid reason 
(save for a reason violative of public policy), an obligation to act in "good 
faith" or "fairly" would be inconsistent with it. However, the draft's 
seemingly progressive assertion in section 2.06(a), that the implied 
obligation does extend to the at-will contract, is followed immediately by 
the assertion in section 2.06(b) that the obligation "must be read consistent 
with the at-will nature of the relationship." The two propositions seem 
discordant.2 03 What the bench, the bar, and the academy are to make of 
these conjoined propositions is, presumably, explained by section 2.06(c). 
This sets out, as embodying the obligation, a duty not to terminate or to 
seek to terminate an employment relationship for one of two reasons: (1) to 
prevent the vesting or accrual of a right or benefit; or, (2) to retaliate 
against the employee for performing a contractual or legal obligation. 
These two and, from what appears in blackletter only these, at once 
embody the implied obligation and remain "consistent with the at-will 
nature of the relationship." 
202. A compendium of cases as of the late 1980s listed about twenty jurisdictions - often lower 
federal courts predicting what state law would be - rejecting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in at-will employment. I HOWARD SPECTER & MATTHEW FINKIN, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND 
LITIGATION § 10.52 (1989 & 1991 Cum. Supp.). More recently, see, e.g., Nguyen v. Voorthius 
Opticians, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 56, 63 (D.D.C. 2007) (applying Virginia law); Niedojaldo v. Central 
Me. Moving & Storage, 715 A.2d 934, 937 (Me. 1998) (declining to imply any covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing beyond insurance contracts and transactions covered by the Uniform Commercial 
Code); Van Lente v. Univ. of Wyo. Research Corp., 975 P.2d 594, 597 (Wyo. 1999). 
203. By this I mean to say i.e., insofar as only at-will employment, in contrast to employment per 
se, is taken to limit the scope of the duty. The District of Columbia, for example, has been insistent that 
good faith and fair dealing do not apply to at-will employment. Gomez v. Tr. of Harvard Univ., 676 F. 
Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1987). But it has embraced good faith and fair dealing in other contractual settings 
including contracts of employment for a stated term. Allworth v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 201-02 
(D.C. 2006). Thus, an employer's decision to terminate an at-will relationship is not subject to 
challenge on the ground of bad faith; but an employer's decision not to renew a contract of employment 
for a fixed duration after its expiration is subject to challenge on that ground. Gaujacq v. Electricite de 
France Int'l, No. Am., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 79, 93 (D.D.C. 2008) (unsuccessful in that case for want of 
any showing of bad faith). So, too, in Louisiana, which has enacted the obligation of good faith in its 
Civil Code, an employee under a contract of permanent employment who has the contractual right to 
terminate the contract by providing notice is bound to exercise the privilege to give notice of 
termination in good faith. Seals v. Calcasieu Parish Voluntary Council on Aging, Inc., 758 So.2d 286, 
294 (La. App. 2000) (the party exercising the right to terminate "'should consider not only his own 
advantage, but the hardship to which the other party would be subjected because of the termination."' 
(citation omitted)). The draft makes no effort to resolve the apparent doctrinal incongruity; indeed, it is 
not mentioned. 
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A. An Assessment 
1. The Doctrinal Grounding 
The Reporters' Notes, Comment a, opine that the seeds of the implied 
covenant were sown in Judge Cardozo's famous opinion in Wood v. Lucy, 
Lady Duff-Gordon.20 4 The doctrine then took root, as exemplified in a 1933 
New York theatrical law decision, and was eventually embodied in section 
205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. That is the extent of the 
draft's grounding. A good deal more needs be said both to assure adequate 
context and to highlight the role of a Restatement as an instrument for legal 
change. 
The implied obligation of good faith in carrying out the obligations of 
a contract has roots in Roman law,2 05 found expression in the medieval jus 
commune,206 and became a major feature in the civil law, notably in 
Germany - in the implied obligation of "fidelity and faith," Treu und 
Glauben, under section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB) of 1900 
and elsewhere on the continent.2 07 In the United Kingdom, however, the 
common law was, generally speaking, hostile to the general implication of 
such an obligation. As late as 1963, for example, Lord Justice Pearson 
could opine with confidence that a "person who has a right under a contract 
... is entitled to exercise it and can effectively exercise it for a good reason 
or bad reason or no reason at all." 2 0 8 According to Robert Summers, such 
was essentially the state of the law in the United States at the same time.20 9 
Both Summers and Allan Farnsworth attribute the subsequent growth 
of law in the United States to two sources. First, to the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) whose primary draftsman, Karl Llewellyn, drew 
upon the German conception of Treu und Glauben.21 0 And second, to 
204. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
205. Martin Josef Schermaier, Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW 63 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000). 
206. James Gordley, Good Faith in Contract Law in the Medieval Jus Commune, in, GOOD FAITH 
IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 205, at 93. 
207. Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmermann, Good Faith in European Contract Law: 
Surveying the Legal Landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 205, at 7. 
208. Chapman v. Honig, [1963] 2 Q.B. 502, 520 (service of notice of termination of a lease, 
pursuant to the notice provision in the lease, because the leasee testified against the landlord in an 
unrelated matter does not render the leasor in contempt of court; Lord Denning dissented). 
209. Robert Summers, The Conceptualization of Good Faith in American Contract Law: A General 
Account, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 205, at 118, 119 ("Before the 
1960s, it could not be said that the American states acknowledged any general obligation of good faith 
in their contract law.") (italics in original). 
210. Id. at 119; E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Performance, in GOOD FAITH AND 
FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 153, 154-55 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995). 
-
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section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which extended the 
obligation beyond transactions covered by the UCC to all contracts as a 
general principle of contract law. In other words, the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is a newcomer to American contract law;211 its content and 
meaning in application remain fully to be developed. Farnsworth notes, 
after a review of competing (and conflicting) views of what the obligation 
does - his view, Professor Summers' view and Professor Steven Burton's 
view - that, 
[c]ourts have looked to all three of these views - Burton's, Summers', 
and mine - for support, often without recognizing a conflict among 
them, which is scarcely surprising, because in the context of performance 
the meaning of good faith may turn on which of its several functions is in 
issue. Sometimes good faith is the basis of a limitation on the exercise of 
discretion conferred on a party . . . Sometimes good faith is the basis for 
proscribing behaviour which violates basic standards of decency . . 
Sometimes it is merely the basis of an implied term to fill a gap or deal 
with an omitted case . . . the most restrictive of the three views. 
Importantly, the Restatement of Contracts has played a key role in 
establishing judicial acceptance of the covenant, just as one might expect 
this Restatement to educate jurisdictions that have not yet come to 
appreciate how the covenant constrains or should constrain the reach of 
employment at will. As will be seen below, however, this draft adopts the 
most restrictive view of what the covenant does, and does so without 
explaining or attempting to justify that choice. 
2. Defining the Obligation 
The vagueness of the obligation poses a challenge to any effort to 
capture it in blackletter terms. As Summers put it, "general definitions of 
good faith either spiral into the Charybdis of vacuous generality or collide 
with the Scylla of restrictive specificity." 2 13 The draft approaches this 
challenge by setting out two groups of cases.214 Two, but only two. 
Comment c does explain that the two case clusters are "not necessarily 
exclusive.,, 2 15 But the thrust of the blackletter treatment obscures the 
possibility that yet other groups of cases could implicate the obligation. In 
211. Maine's declination to extend the covenant to at-will employees is in keeping with its refusal 
to extend the covenant to any transaction outside the UCC, except for insurance contracts. Niedojaldo v. 
Central Me. Moving & Storage, 715 A.2d 934, 937 (Me. 1998). 
212. Farnsworth, supra note 210, at 163. 
213. Summers, supra note 209, at 128. 
214. The Reporters do not acknowledge the commonality in approach, but this is just what German 
treatise writers attempt to do with Treu und Glauben, to set out groups of cases, Fallgruppen, for 
"orderly and rational analysis" of the obligation. Whittaker & Zimmermann, supra note 207, at 23. 
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 cmt. c, at 96. 
. 
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fact, that possibility is made ever more remote by the explicit rejection in 
the Reporters' Notes of one category of potential application and the most 
obvious one at that. More on that in a moment; but first to the two 
situations the draft does admit. 
The first is a discharge to prevent the payment or accrual of a right or 
a benefit. 2 16 Comment c explains that this is not inconsistent with the at-
will rule - in its strong form, the license the employer enjoys to dismiss for 
any reason whatsoever - because the contractual promise of the benefit or 
the right implies that the employer will not act to deny the right or benefit it 
promised, i.e., by promising the benefit or the right the employer has tacitly 
agreed to modify the at-will nature of the employment by limiting to that 
extent the exercise of its otherwise plenary power to discharge. 217 By that 
reasoning, however, this group of cases has less to do with discharge than 
with an employee's contractual right to an accrued benefit or promised 
compensation. Consequently, the draft provides that the remedy in this 
discharge case is restitution of the benefit or right denied, not compensation 
(or reinstatement) for the discharge. And, in point of fact, there is good law 
that an employer may not act opportunistically to modify its compensation 
policies even when no discharge from employment is involved.2 18 In other 
words, contract law need not draw upon any notion of "good faith" to 
achieve this result. 2 19 
The second category is a discharge in retaliation for the employee's 
performing her contractual (or legal) obligations.220 As the draft's 
illustrations make clear, this category hinges on deciding just what the 
employee's contractual job duties are,221 which may be more nuanced than 
the draft's brief treatment acknowledges. But, again, being discharged for 
216. Id. 
217. Id. § 2.06 cmt c, at 96-97 
218. For example, Minnesota does not recognize any obligation of good faith and fair dealing in 
employment contracts. Brozo v. Oracle Corp., 324 F.3d 661, 668 (8th Cir. 2003). But when a contract 
term, for example, governing the payment of commissions, leaves discretion to the employer, that 
discretion cannot be exercised on the basis of fraud, bad faith, or in "gross mistake of judgment." Id. at 
667; accord Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Allen D. Shadron, Inc. v. Cole, 
416 P.2d 555, 557 (Ariz. 1966) aff'd on reh'g 419 P.2d 520 (Ariz. 1966). Thus an employer may not 
reject an order procured by a salesman for the purpose of depriving the salesman of the commission that 
would be due on the sale. Callahan v. Prince Albert Pulp Co., 581 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir. 1978). 
219. This point is made with customary brio by then Circuit Judge Scalia in Tymshare, Inc. v. 
Covell, 727 F.2d at 1152-53. 
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 cmt. d. As to the performance of 
obligations imposed by law, as the draft notes this is also covered by its treatment of the tort of 
discharge for a reason violative of public policy. It remains to be seen what is added by subsuming legal 
obligations additionally into a contract claim. Indeed, though this section never mentions it, by treating 
the covenant as solely a matter of contract the draft tacitly rejects a tort theory of bad faith with obvious 
if unaddressed remedial consequences. 
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 cmt. d, illus. 2. 
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doing what one has been authorized to do could be in breach of contract 
without the need to refer to an implied duty of good faith. Just as in the first 
category, the employer's authorization to do the act implies that one will 
not be dismissed for doing what one has been told or allowed to do, just as 
a contracting party may not prevent the others' performance. The 
authorization to do the act contractually modifies the employer's right 
otherwise to dismiss at will. 2 22 Here, as on the question of whether the 
courts should acquiesce in an employer's opportunistic exercise of the 
power it reserved to defeat the accrual of a right or benefit, there are cases 
to the contrary.223 But it is important to note that the two propositions the 
draft lays out to define what the covenant means can and have been dealt 
with without the implication of an implied obligation of good faith. 
3. The Limit of the Draft's Reach 
What is remarkable is the draft's foreclosure of any potential for 
broadening the doctrine's application to other situations where good faith 
and fair dealing would apply under section 205 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts; to take only one if rather striking example, to prohibit a 
discharge grounded in malice or duplicity. The draft's rejection of this 
application is made clear in the Reporters' Notes. It states that, "This 
Section disagrees with the broader implications" 224 in Monge v. Beebe 
Rubber Co., which held open that very prospect, 22 5 albeit later narrowed by 
that court.226 The Reporters' Notes next proceed immediately to close out 
the treatment of this question with equal brevity: "In some jurisdictions, the 
covenant does appear to have a broader scope and is invoked as a 
contractual basis for challenging fraud or deceit by the employer or its 
agents."227 
That is the extent of the draft's discussion: Any judicial inquiry into 
dishonesty, malice, or more is foreclosed because the draft says it is to be. 
No more is offered. But surely more has to be said. 
Delaware is not alone in giving the covenant a broader reach. Montana 
similarly forbade discharge of an at-will employee grounded in 
222. Hammond v. Heritage Commc'n Inc., 756 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Ky. App. 1988). 
223. DeVries v. McNeil Consumer Prods. Co., 593 A.2d 819 (N.J. App. Div. 1991) which the draft 
acknowledges; see also Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1990); Murphy v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983). 
224. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 reporters' notes cmt. b, at 99. 
225. 316 A.2d 551 (N.H. 1974). 
226. Howard v. Dort Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980). 
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 reporters' notes cmt. b, at 99 (citing 
Rizzitiello v. McDonald's Corp., 868 A.2d 825, 831 (Del. 2005). 
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dishonesty, 228 which common law doctrine was broadened and superceded 
by the enactment of a statute prohibiting unfair dismissal generally. Alaska 
has given the covenant the most detailed attention. It has distinguished the 
two components - "good faith," a subjective component, and "fair 
dealing," an objective component - as having independent application.229 
The employer commits a subjective breach "when it discharges an 
employee for the purpose of depriving him or her of one of the benefits 
of the contract." The objective aspect of the covenant requires that the 
emploger act in a manner that a reasonable person would regard as 
fair. 
The draft accepts the former proposition of Alaskan law; but it rejects 
the latter without explanation or even reference to the fact that that is the 
law in this jurisdiction. In fact, Alaska requires that employers "treat like 
employees alike" in exercising the prerogative to discharge. 23 1 The draft 
accepts this very principle when an employer exercises its prerogative to 
dismiss under contracts of fixed or indefinite duration requiring just cause 
to dismiss; 232 but it refuses to apply the same principle of equal protection 
to the discharge of at-will employees. The draft declines to note the 
disparity; nor does it mention that at least one state would have employers 
treat all employees alike when it comes to the differential application of a 
ground for discharge. 
The reader is left entirely to speculate on why employers should be 
contractually unconstrained to act out of malice or duplicity, for example, 
when discharging an at-will employee but not when exercising the 
analogous privilege to terminate a business relationship that they are 
otherwise privileged to terminate.2 33 The only answer that can be teased out 
of the text is that to do so would be "inconsistent" with the at-will rule 
under section 2.06(b). That would be so if the draft were to cast its 
restatement of the at-will rule in robust nineteenth century laissez-faire 
228. E.g., Stark v. Circle K. Corp., 751 P.2d 162, 167 (Mont. 1988). 
229. Charles v. Interior Reg'I Hous. Auth., 55 P.3d 57, 62 (Alaska 2002). 
230. Id. (quoting Finch v. Greatland Foods, Inc., 21 P.3d 1282, 1286-87 (Alaska 2001)). Note that 
the test of business reasonableness, applied to commercial transactions by the UCC, would be 
foreclosed by the draft in the employment setting. See text accompanying note 234, infra. 
231. Charles, 55 P.3d at 62 (quoting Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789 n.6 
(Alaska 1989)). 
232. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 2.03 illus. 12. 
233. As the court in Bohne v. Computer Assoc. Int'l., Inc., 445 F.Supp.2d 177 (D. Mass. 2006), 
noted, the courts "have applied the duty of good faith to override a range of express termination 
clauses." Id. at 182 (citing Randolph v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383, 1386-87 (6th 
Cir. 1975) and involving termination of a general agency agreement), rev'd on other grounds, 514 F.3d 
141 (1st Cir. 2008); see also de Treville v. Outdoor Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 1100 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(termination of a franchise agreement), Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 600 (N.J. 1973) 
(same). 
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terms - as expressly including a license to discharge dishonestly or 
maliciously. But the draft does not do that. Section 2.01, which proposes to 
restate the at-will rule, provides only that absent agreement on duration or 
requiring just cause to discharge, the employer is free to discharge at any 
time; thus the employer, absent an obligation to do so, need not be required 
to prove just cause to dismiss. But nothing in that formulation is 
inconsistent with an obligation implied by law not to discharge maliciously 
or dishonestly, for such a limitation, the burden of proof of which rests with 
the employee, does not require proof of just cause, just as the Delaware 
courts have made clear.234 Thus, the adoption of the common law approach 
taken in Montana earlier and taken today in Delaware and Alaska is no 
more "inconsistent" with the at-will rule, as a rule only governing the 
duration of employment, than is a rule disallowing a discharge to defeat the 
accrual of a benefit or in retaliation for doing what one has been told to do. 
It could be that the draft's effort to close off this course of legal 
development is grounded in an economic judgment. That is what the 
Colorado Court of Appeals said in just such a case, of a discharge allegedly 
rigged on fraudulent grounds: 
The at-will employment doctrine promotes flexibility and discretion for 
employees to see the best position to suit their talents and for employers 
to seek the best employees to suit their needs. By removing 
encumbrances to quitting a job or firing an employee, the at-will doctrine 
promotes a free market in employment analogous to the free market in 
goods and services generally. 
But the obligation to act honestly and in good faith has been applied to 
the market in goods and services generally; that, at least, is the thrust of the 
UCC and of section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
Consequently, if the basis of the draft's rejection is grounded in an 
234. Ulmer v. Home Depot, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 474, 477-78 (D. Del. 2007). 
235. Wisehart v. Meganck, 66 P.3d 124, 126 (Colo. App. 2002) (emphasis added). There was a 
strong dissent in that case as well. Id. at 130 (Webb, J., dissenting). Ironically, the widely accepted rule 
is that managers and supervisors who do not act in good faith in the employer's interest or for a bona 
fide business reason but out of personal hostility to cause the employer to discharge an at-will employee 
may be civilly liable for the tort of malicious interference in current or prospective economic advantage. 
2 SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 202, § 13.02; see, e.g., Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 944 (1st Cir. 
2008) (applying Massachusetts law). "[A] supervisor can be liable for tortious interference if 'actual 
malice' . . was the 'controlling factor' in the [supervisors'] interference' . . [A]ctual malice is a 
'spiteful, malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimate corporate interest." Welch, 542 F.3d at 944 
(citations omitted). And such would seem to be the law in Colorado. Preston v. Atmel Corp., 560 F. 
Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (D. Colo. 2008) (reviewing authority). In such a case, the manager who effects the 
discharge would be liable, but the company that dismisses on the ground of the manager's malice would 
not. Nowhere does the draft advert to this anomaly which places both the jurisprudential and economic 
grounding of the preclusion of corporate liability in question. The draft's refusal to engage with this 
anomaly is all of a piece with its refusal to mention the analogous incongruity of limiting the obligation 
of good faith to employment at will while applying it to employment of fixed duration. See supra note 
203 and the text accompanying notes 231 and 232. 
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economic distinction between fairness in the market for goods and fairness 
in the market for services provided by independent contractors and 
franchisees on the one hand, and fairness in market for labor provided by 
employees on the other, that distinction needs rather badly to be articulated, 
and the economic bases engaged with for the economic proposition is by no 
means self-evident.236 As it is, those who are to have recourse to the 
proposed Restatement are left with nothing more than the Reporters' - and, 
if adopted, the ALI's - naked preference that the courts should not develop 
the obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship 
as it has been understood in mainstream contract law actually to require 
good faith and fair dealing. 
B. Stultification 
As late as the mid-1970s, there was little in the nature of a robust 
obligation to observe good faith and fair dealing in the common law of 
employment on either side of the English-speaking Atlantic. The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts' endorsement of such an obligation, 
generalized to all contractual relations, is as yet imperfectly realized in 
employment law. But in Great Britain, the courts have vitalized the law by 
creating and expanding the "implied obligation of trust and confidence" in 
the employment relationship,237 starting first with the judicial treatment of 
constructive discharge the late 70s and 80s and broadening out since; 238 
and similar legal expansion can be seen elsewhere in jurisdictions in the 
orbit of the common law, notably in Australia. 239 This is not to say that 
these courts have supplanted the exercise of reasonable business judgment: 
236. See generally SIMON DEAKIN & PRABIRJIT SARKAR, ASSESSING THE LONG-RUN ECONOMIC 
IMPACT OF LABOUR LAW SYSTEMS: A THEORETICAL REAPPRAISAL AN ANALYSIS OF NEW TIME SERIES 
DATA 4 (CLPE Research Paper No. 6, 2008); cf BRUNO AMBLE ET AL., EMPLOYMENT PERFORMANCE 
AND INSTITUTIONS: NEW ANSWERS TO AN OLD QUESTION (IZA Discussion Paper No. 2731, 2007). 
237. MARK FREEDLAND, THE PERSONAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 154 (2003). 
238. Id. at 154-70; see also Douglas Brodie, The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and 
Confidence, 25 INDUS. L.J. [U.K.] 121 (1996). On more recent legal shifts, see Douglas Brodie, Mutual 
Trust and Confidence: Catalysts, Constraints and Commonality, 37 INDUS. L.J. [U.K.] 329 (2008). 
239. See ROSEMARY OWENS & JOELLEN RILEY, THE LAW OF WORK 196, 254-60 (2007); see also 
Guy Davidov, Unbound: Some Comments on Israel's Judicially-Developed Labor Law, 30 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POL'Y J. 283 (2009) (discussing a judicially imposed restriction on dismissal as being "based 
doctrinally on the duty to perform contracts in good faith," and efforts by now retired Justice Elisheva 
Barak-Oroskin of the National Labor Court to replace the Israeli default rule with one of "just cause"). 
Professor Davidov acknowledges Israel's "common-law roots," but discounts that as explaining the 
expansion of employee protection at the hands of the judiciary. 
Faced with changing realities in the labor market, judges developed the law in a way 
they considered most suitable. They sometimes looked for inspiration from other legal 
systems - common law as well as civil law ones - but mostly just based their new 
developments on normative considerations. 
Id. at 309. 
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"Even those jurists who are generally quite favourable towards good faith 
accept that it should not be allowed to lead to the idea of an 'absolute 
altruism negating one's own interests' .,,240 But it is to say that by 
ensconcing a particularly narrow interpretation of the covenant, by limiting 
it to situations where it need not be called upon at all,24 ' the draft would 
blunt the growth of the law of good faith and fair dealing more in line with 
mainstream contract doctrine. As that appears to be the Reporters' 
normative judgment, they should make it explicit. If they did, the issue 
would be publicly joined of whether it is an appropriate exercise of its 
influence for the ALI to attempt to steer the courts away from taking up 
standards of "decency" and "fairness," to use the language of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and consider applying them to the most 
common form of the employment relationship. 
240. Whittaker & Zimmermann, supra note 207, at 38 (quoting Jacques Mestic (reference 
omitted)). 
241. As the Reporters note of the first case cluster, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
already prohibits the discharge of an employee for the purpose of interfering in the attainment of any 
right to which a benefits plan participant may become entitled under that Act. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 cmt. c, at 96. A similar result can and has been reached grounded in state 
wage payment law. See, e.g., Cook v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 488 A.2d 1295 (Conn. Super. 
1985). 
